

**Report of the
Joint Fire/Police
Task Force on**



**CIVIL
UNREST**

**Recommendations for
Organization and
Operations During
Civil Disturbance**



**FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY**



**United States
Fire Administration**

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PREFACE

Concerned about the possible escalation in the incidents of riots and other forms of civil unrest and about the ability of firefighters to deal effectively with such situations in the context of the 1990s, the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA), in cooperation with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), assembled a task force in June 1992 of the nation's leading fire chiefs, who were later joined by their police counterparts.

The newly formed Task Force on Civil Unrest convened a series of meetings over the next seven months to analyze the April 1992 Los Angeles civil disorders and to share what proved to be valuable experiences in dealing with civil unrest, from the viewpoints of both fire and police agencies. The Task Force was successful in reaching its goal-to formulate a plan of joint action to combat civil unrest in the U.S. today.

A "lessons learned" report, the document which follows was prepared in anticipation of future civil unrest occurrences nationwide. History was made at these meetings as policies and procedures to combat civil unrest were consolidated and refined to meet the needs of today's society. We at the USFA are extremely pleased that for the first time in recent memory, police and fire executives were able to sit and work together, to voice their concerns and wishes, and to come to a basic agreement on how their personnel can best cooperate in the field. It is anticipated that numerous lives will be saved through the joint efforts of this distinguished and influential panel of police and fire executives who gathered and worked harmoniously.

The dynamics of these meetings, from the inception of the Task Force in June 1992 in Emmitsburg, Maryland, to the culmination in a successful team effort offering solutions to address future civil unrest problems in January 1993 in Denver, Colorado, have made this a remarkable and historic experience for the USFA.

Whenever a community needs help, it (more often than not) calls on its fire and/or police services. Our communities will benefit as a result of the findings of the Task Force on Civil Unrest, and our country will become better able to combat civil disturbances and maintain national peace.

We are grateful to the Task Force members for their exemplary efforts in improving the ability of fire and police personnel to work together and better serve communities throughout the nation.

TASK FORCE ON CIVIL UNREST

FIRE CHIEFS

Rayfield Alfred
Chief (Ret.), District of Columbia Fire Department
Washington, D.C.

Donald Anthony
Deputy Chief, Los Angeles Fire Department
Los Angeles, California

William Austin
Chief, Tampa Fire Department
Tampa, Florida

David Chamberlin
Chief, Atlanta Fire Department
Atlanta, Georgia

Michael E. Dalton
Deputy Chief, Baltimore City Fire Department
Baltimore, Maryland

Harry Diezel
Chief, City of Virginia Beach Fire Department
Virginia Beach, Virginia

Col. Duke
Chief (Ret.), City of Miami Fire/Rescue
Department
Miami, Florida

Gary Easton
Chief, San Diego Fire Department
San Diego, California

Michael Freeman
Chief, Los Angeles County Fire Department
Los Angeles, California

George George
Assistant Chief (Ret.), San Diego Fire Department
San Diego, California

Richard Gonzales
Chief, Denver Fire Department
Denver, Colorado

Claude Harris
Chief (Ret.), Seattle Fire Department
Seattle, Washington

Chris A. Hunter
Chief, Long Beach Fire Department
Long Beach, California

Donald O. Manning
Chief, Los Angeles City Fire Department
Los Angeles, California

George Monogue
Chief, Portland Fire Department
Portland, Oregon

Frederick F. Postel
Chief (Ret.), San Francisco Fire Department
Novato, California

Neil Svetanics
Chief, St. Louis Fire Department
St. Louis, Missouri

Clell West
Chief, Las Vegas Fire Department
Las Vegas, Nevada

POLICE CHIEFS

Phillip Arreola
Chief, Milwaukee Police Department
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Eldrin A. Bell
Chief, Atlanta Police Department
Atlanta, Georgia

Raymond Burkart
Deputy Chief, New Orleans Police Department
New Orleans, Louisiana

Dean DeJong
Major, Miami Police Department
Miami, Florida

Melvin C. High
Assistant Chief, Metropolitan Police Department
Washington, D. C.

Stephen Jeffries
Deputy Chief, Denver Police Department
Denver, Colorado

Curtis Lane
Deputy Chief, Tampa Police Department
Tampa, Florida

Thomas Maloney, Superintendent
Chief, Bureau of Field Services
Boston Police Department
Boston, Massachusetts

Raul Martinez
Assistant Chief, Miami Police Department
Miami, Florida

Thomas Potter
Chief, Portland Police Bureau
Portland, Oregon

UNITED STATES FIRE ADMINISTRATION

Olin L. Greene
U.S. Fire Administrator (Former)
U.S. Fire Administration

George W. Buck, Jr.
Project Manager, Moderator
U.S. Fire Administration

Charles Burke11
Training Specialist, Group Facilitator
National Fire Academy
U.S. Fire Administration

Anthony D. Manno
Training Specialist, Group Facilitator
National Fire Academy
U.S. Fire Administration

Edward Wall
Deputy Administrator
U.S. Fire Administration

Phyllis A. Kreitz
Program Analyst
U.S. Fire Administration

Dr. Burton Clark
Training Specialist, Group Facilitator
National Fire Academy
U.S. Fire Administration

Kenneth H. Stewart
Moderator
Stewart Training Associates

Richard Adams
Moderator
RDA Associates

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1

OVERVIEW

The Rodney King beating verdicts reached in April 1992 by a suburban Simi Valley jury triggered civil unrest in cities across the nation, including Atlanta and Chicago. The most devastating reaction occurred in Los Angeles, where fifty-three people died in the ensuing riots. The intensity and magnitude of the riots caught city officials by surprise and unprepared to deal with the lawlessness and violence which followed. The resulting mass destruction of property in the city of Los Angeles totalled over \$1 billion.

The repercussions of the riots were a major challenge to firefighters, police officers, and supporting agencies, who fought large-scale property destruction and numerous arson fires, complicated by violent reaction from angry citizens.

In the months following the riots, the Office of Fire Prevention and Arson Control of the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) joined with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to convene a task force of distinguished members of the nation's fire and police chiefs. Their mission was to study the problem of civil unrest, in general, evaluate what took place in Los Angeles, and formulate innovative strategies to deal with

future instances of civil disturbance. This report presents the recommendations of the Task Force on Civil Unrest for dealing with civil disorder. The Task Force is aware that the needs and resources of communities vary; a single set of guidelines to address the problem of civil disorder nationwide would be ineffective and difficult to implement.

In crisis situations, concerned agencies respond differently, stemming from variations in tasks, jurisdictions, education, geographical environment, level of preparedness, and other administrative and political considerations. Consequently, they are drawn into a crisis at different moments, with varying viewpoints and purposes. Considering these divergent responsibilities, it is essential to coordinate efforts to mitigate and control civil disorders.

One means of addressing civil unrest is to develop a "menu" approach for joint action between law enforcement and fire/emergency medical service (EMS) agencies. A list of strategies that a community may adopt "as is," or interchange as needed, is compiled. Even with this approach, joint action between police and fire personnel may

not be the best strategy to control a particular situation. (In some circumstances, allowing the crisis to run its course may be the best policy.)

In November 1976, the President’s Commission on Civil Disorders participated in a Department of Justice planning conference on “Prevention and Control of Civil Disturbance.” The commission assessed police preparedness in handling civil disorders and suggested that police back-up support from other agencies, such as the National Guard, is essential. The commission also stressed the need for improved communications, better intelligence information, and training in the use of nonlethal weapons (USDOJ).

The report presented here addresses key issues to be considered by fire and police personnel and other support agencies in their efforts to work cooperatively to save lives and property during civil unrest situations. These recommendations require adaptation within the context of the jurisdiction and the environment in which the disturbance occurs. A successful collaboration among agencies will depend on:

1. Compatibility of the agencies
2. Adaptation of a common technical terminology
3. A strong joint command structure

4. Regularly scheduled joint training exercises
5. Effective mutual aid agreements

A PICTURE OF THE NEAR FUTURE

The 1990 census yielded a wealth of information projecting how the U.S. will look in the future. Demographic data forecast a rapidly integrating society, a sharp increase in the ratio of diverse peoples and cultures to the white majority over the last two decades. Multicultural diversity has thrown together many people who are compelled to interact on a daily basis.

In 1990, the U.S. population totalled 248.7 million, an increase of 22.1 million since the 1980 census. **Table 1-1** illustrates the percentage increase in ethnic populations between 1980 and 1990.

Census experts project that population growth rates will continue to increase at an uneven rate through the next decade, mostly in the Southeast and West. States growing most rapidly tend to have a high percentage of minorities, especially youths, who are seeking to find their niche in society and the American way of life. During this adjustment process they are vulnerable to friction with established norms as they try to “fit in”. Because peer pressure tends to heighten this

Table 1-1. U.S. Population and Percent Change (by Race and Ethnicity), 1980-1990

Race/Ethnic Group	Number 1990	Percent of Total Population 1990	Percent Increase 1980-1990
	(000)		
Total, U.S.	248,710	100.0	9.8
White, non-Hispanic	187,137	75.2	6.0
Black	29,986	12.1	13.2
Native American, Eskimo, Aleut	1,959	0.8	37.9
Asian/Pacific Islander	7,274	2.9	107.8
Hispanic (of any race)	22,354	9.0	53.0

Source: “A Demographic Look at Tomorrow,” Hodgkinson 1992.

friction, such groups are potentially volatile, especially during the summer months when schools are in recess, jobs are scarce, and temperatures are sweltering. A minor issue deemed prejudicial to any of these groups could spark an angry reaction and lead to a violent response.

THE NATURE OF RIOTS

A riot may be defined as an unlawful assembly (several people who intend to unite for confrontation) which has developed to a stage of violence. *Black's Law Dictionary* further defines *riot* as a "public disturbance involving (1) an act or acts of violence by one or more persons part of an assemblage of three or more persons, which act or acts shall constitute a clear and present danger of, or shall result in, damage or injury to the property of any other person or to the person of any other individual, or (2) a threat or threats of the commission of an act or acts of violence . . . would constitute a clear and present danger of, or would

result in, damage or injury to the property of any other person or to the person of any other individual" (Black 1990).

In general, riots are formed in several distinct stages. The first stage occurs when a group of people is moved to commit acts of civil disorder. In the second stage, other individuals with no interest in the issue join the action to take advantage of an opportunity to loot and destroy property. The third stage occurs when organized youth gangs join the disturbance and take it to their communities. Actions can range from looting to ambush and sniper attacks directed against police and fire personnel. At times, youth gangs will design diversionary tactics such as fires to distract police from the intended target(s).

Given these distinct stages in the development of a riot, police and fire agencies must be prepared to respond quickly, with adequate equipment, tactical plans, and sufficient personnel to control potential civil unrest.

2

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE



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2

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

THE FIRE SERVICE

Significant riot activity during the summer months has been recorded over the past three decades; some of the most notable occurred in Washington, D. C., Newark, New Jersey, and the Watts district of Los Angeles. The late 1980s and early 1990s have seen similar activities, for example, the Greekfest riots in Virginia Beach, Virginia, in the late 1980s; the disturbances in the Mount Pleasant area of Washington, D.C., in 1991; the Los Angeles riots following the Rodney King verdicts; and the unrest in Denver, Colorado, in December 1992.

The jury decision to acquit in the first Rodney King court case sparked unrest in Southern California and in several other cities across the U.S. Although the major disturbance occurred in Los Angeles, other cities experienced looting, violence, and property damage. Numerous fire and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) departments exhausted their resources in attempting to respond to calls for assistance. The Los Angeles Emergency Operations Department (LAEOD) reported over 45,000 fire-related responses and fifty-three

fatalities. Current damage reports exceed \$1 billion.

Fire Department personnel responding to fire emergencies received minimal or no proper police protection from the rioters. The protection of citizens and responding fire service personnel became a primary issue. Faced with the possibility of more riots and other forms of civil unrest, and concerned with the ability of firefighters to deal effectively with such situations in the future, the USFA's Office of Fire Prevention and Arson Control assembled and convened the Task Force on Civil Unrest. The first meeting was attended by some of the nation's leading fire chiefs, who were later joined by their police chief counterparts. At the first joint meeting, the group analyzed the Los Angeles incident and shared valuable experiences in dealing with civil unrest, from both fire and police points of view. A major goal of the Task Force was to formulate a joint plan of action for firefighters and police officers to address civil unrest today. A steering committee met in St. Louis, Missouri, and two follow-up workshops were held in San Diego, California, and Denver,

Colorado, The Task Force members developed the framework of issues addressed in this report.

RECENT CIVIL DISTURBANCES

Some instances of civil unrest which have occurred during the last five years are listed below, with their resulting consequences, followed by a discussion of five significant civil disorders.

1. 1992-Los Angeles and other cities nationwide: thousands arrested; some deaths; billions of dollars in property damage; law enforcement, the National Guard, and federal troops called in to assist.
2. 1991-Crown Heights, New York City, New York: 142 arrested; 105 civilians and police injured,
3. 1991-Mount Pleasant, Washington, D.C.: 245 arrested; 40 businesses damaged/destroyed; 69 police vehicles damaged, 7 destroyed.
4. 1989-Virginia Beach, Virginia: hundreds arrested; dozens injured; 100 stores looted; damage reported at \$1.4 million; 1,200 National Guard troops and police called in.
5. 1988-Tomkins Square Park, New York City, New York: 9 arrested; 18 police officers injured.

LOS ANGELES-A CASE STUDY OF A LARGE CITY

At approximately 1:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992, the Los Angeles District Attorney's office was informed that the verdicts had been reached by the jury deliberating the Rodney King beating trial. Although the outcome of the verdicts was unknown, the prosecutors learned that the jury had not reached verdicts on all counts. At the request of the prosecutors, the judge ordered a two-hour delay in announcing the verdicts-to enable the media, which was providing unprecedented live coverage of the trial, to ready itself to broadcast the event.

When the jury's verdicts were read at 3:00 p.m., they were broadcast simultaneously to the entire city. The reaction in many areas was one of shock and anger. Although there were limited expressions of support for the verdicts and the

criminal justice system, many who had seen the taped beating replayed repeatedly during the preceding weeks and months reluctantly accepted the outcome.

In South Central Los Angeles, crowds began to congregate almost immediately to protest the verdicts. The street corner protests began to grow in number and size-first angry and then violent-a situation dramatized by the beating of a white truck driver four hours after the verdicts were announced. During the next six days, the reaction escalated into a terrifying reign of violence, widespread looting, and mass destruction of property in many communities across the city. The swiftness and ferocity of these events stunned the entire city and nation.

The first incident, which occurred within an hour after the verdicts were announced, took place in the Hyde Park neighborhood of the 77th Street Police District. The intersection of Florence and Normandie, considered one of the "flash points," was the scene of repeated violent activity beginning before 4:00 p.m. The events there were covered by live television and reached their peak at approximately 6:45 p.m., when several young African-American males dragged Reginald Denny, a passing motorist, from his truck and beat him close to death. The violence and lawlessness escalated and spread to the north and west.

By 6:30 p.m., a crowd had gathered outside Parker Center, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) headquarters, which had been stormed and vandalized within the hour. This incident gripped the attention of police commanders. Firefighters were being attacked-one was shot and hospitalized in the early evening while responding to a call. The lawlessness involved physical violence, looting, and arson, which resulted in massive destruction of property. According to the City in *Crisis*, the rioting was cyclical in nature and occurred with equal intensity in daylight hours and during the night, unlike past civil disorders. Disturbances which began in the morning gathered momentum during the day and reached a high point in the evening, declining during the early morning hours. Destruction was most severe on the second day and tapered off only on the fourth and fifth days. By the time the violence waned,

fifty-three people were dead, over 869 structures were burned, and some \$1 billion in property was either damaged or destroyed. For many days after, it was impossible for people living in South Central and Koreatown to purchase the minimum necessities (Webster and Williams 1992).

The initial response of many city officials was marked by uncertainty, confusion, and lack of coordination. Within the LAPD, there was no meaningful integration with any other arm of government. The LAPD was uncharacteristically hesitant in responding to initial incidents of disorder—which later would be considered a major factor in their inability to control the unrest.

In August 1993, William Webster, Special Advisor City to the Board of Police Commissioners, City of Los Angeles, reported, “. . . the Fire Department performed admirably under the most adverse possible circumstances. As the fires spread across Los Angeles beginning in the late afternoon of April 29, 1992, unprecedented demands were placed on the Los Angeles City Fire Department, in particular, because it was forced to respond to calls for assistance while confronted at times by hostile individuals and crowds armed with assorted weapons. The firefighters were severely hampered by the response time and level of escort support which the Los Angeles Police Department was able to muster. This circumstance is alluded to in our report, the *City in Crisis* . . . The LAFD had prepared internally for a civil disturbance and had attempted to initiate planning activities with the LAPD. We must recognize that during a riot or civil disturbance the responsibility to fight fires and deliver emergency medical service rests not only with the Fire Department, but also with the Los Angeles Police Department, which is charged with the critical responsibility of protecting firefighters and paramedics from the threat of armed, hostile individuals. Fire Department personnel do not carry weapons; they depend on law enforcement to protect them and, without adequate protection, they simply cannot do their job” (Webster 1993).

The nature of the city

The Rodney King incident did not occur in a vacuum but within the context of the entire social,

economic, and political climates of Los Angeles.

Tensions that existed in these climates undoubtedly had a profound impact on the public’s perception of and reaction to the videotaped beating and on the nature of the LAPD command staff’s response to the lawlessness that followed the jury’s “not guilty” verdicts.

In the past decade, Los Angeles has experienced rapid demographic and economic changes. The make-up of the population has shifted to 40 percent Hispanic, 37 percent white, 13 percent African American, 9 percent Asian American, and 1 percent Native American. As the ethnic make-up of the city has changed, so has the economic stratification of its population. By 1990, more than

“Tensions that existed. . . had a profound impact on the public’s perception and reaction to the videotaped beating and . . . to the lawlessness that followed the jury’s verdicts.”

18.5 percent of the city’s residents were living below the poverty level. According to the *City in Crisis*, these demographic changes have caused significant stratification of the city by neighborhood. The areas of South and Central Los Angeles, overwhelmingly populated by African Americans and Hispanics, have experienced despairingly high unemployment—20 to 40 percent of the residents live below the poverty level. By contrast, several of the communities on the west side remain fairly homogeneous white neighborhoods with minimal levels of poverty. These circumstances have contributed to strong economic and social tensions, the most notable being the conflict in South Central between African Americans and Korean Americans. The two groups have lived alongside one another for the past decade but have experienced dramatically different economic changes (Webster and Williams 1992).

Existing tensions in this community were heightened by the Harlins-Du incident just months before the King verdict. The sentence of five-years’ probation imposed on a middle-aged

Korean-American grocer, who was found by a jury to be guilty of fatally shooting a fifteen-year-old African-American girl, deeply angered and caused many in the African-American community to lose confidence in the law enforcement and judicial systems. This case contributed to the tense atmosphere preceding the unrest.

On the eve of the verdicts, Los Angeles was in the midst of a spiraling economic downturn. Although the strain of the deepening recession had been hard on the entire city, it was especially severe on the African-American community. The disproportionately high levels of unemployment and poverty in the African-American neighborhoods were, by most accounts, giving rise to growing levels of tension, frustration, and anger that contributed to the tense atmosphere preceding the unrest.

According to the *City in Crisis*, the atmosphere preceding the verdicts was also characterized by widespread tension between minority communities and the LAPD. African Americans, especially young males, felt they were frequently the victims of police mistreatment, racism, and abuse, a feeling also shared by leaders of the Hispanic communities, Korean Americans held a similar view and believed that they did not receive adequate protection from the LAPD. In general, there was a widespread perception within the minority communities that the police gave priority to protecting affluent white neighborhoods over minority communities such as South Central, the Pica-Union area, and Koreatown (Webster and Williams 1992).

The city's emergency frame work

Under the Local Emergencies Ordinance, the Los Angeles City Council established the Emergency Operations Organization (EOO) and placed it under the exclusive direction of Mayor Tom Bradley. The City Council established the Emergency Operations Board (EOB), composed of the principal city departments whose services would be needed in an emergency. Police Chief Daryl Gates, as deputy director of the EOO and permanent chair of its board, was placed in charge of response operations, subject to the mayor's direction. The City Administrative Officer (CAO), as

EOO Coordinator, was placed in charge of the city's preparation activities. To assist in this effort, the Board appointed the Emergency Management Committee, which constitutes the working staff of the EOO and is directed by a member of the CAO's staff. In the event of an emergency, the city's response is coordinated in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), located in a concrete bunker four floors beneath City Hall East and staffed by LAPD officers, representatives of the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD), and other agencies whose personnel assume these additional responsibilities. Figure 2-1 illustrates the make-up of the city's Emergency Operations Organization.

Law enforcement actions-LAPD tactics

It was not until approximately 6:45 p.m. on April 29 that the LAPD called a department-wide tactical alert. At about the same time, the commanding officer of the LAPD Support Services Bureau responded to the EOC-the designated department chief arrived an hour later. On-duty police officers were outnumbered by rioters and stood by as looters made several trips into stores.

At 9:00 p.m., after a briefing by LAPD commanders on the rapidly deteriorating situation, Mayor Bradley declared a dusk-to-dawn local state of emergency. Bus service in the South Central district was halted and the area's 700 public schools were closed. The National Guard was notified and immediately began mobilizing troops in the California National Guard armories throughout the state.


In early afternoon, Thursday, April 30, the first National Guard troops were sent into the streets. At Police Chief Gates' request, the guard was ready and prepared for action, Within two days of the first request and after two additional call-ups of 2,000 troops, the National Guard had approximately 7,000 troops available to quell the disturbance. The troops moved into action relatively quickly. This show of force was a significant factor in the subsequent dissipation of disorder, rioting, and looting.

On May 1, President George Bush issued an Executive Order federalizing the National Guard. This action placed the guard under the command of the U.S. Army. Federalization consolidated the

Figure 2-1

Emergency Operations Organization

City of Los Angeles



Source: City in Crisis, 1992.

operations of all federal agencies (e.g., the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms [ATF] and the Bureau of Prisons) under the direction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Before the President's Executive Order, other federal agencies were operating independently. The FBI, which became the lead agency for coordinating federal response, has a well-established relationship with the LAPD, which augured well in expediting an end to the disturbance.

The ATF prepared and disseminated an updated list of all firearm licensees in the city. Approximately 200 ATF agents (along with the California Highway Patrol) assisted patrol officers and protected firefighters. Additional support was provided by the Bureau of Prisons, whose agents are specially trained to handle riot situations and hostage negotiations, and the U.S. Customs Service, which mobilized 200 agents,

The LAFD's response

Statement from Donald O. Manning, Chief Engineer and General Manager, Los Angeles City Fire Department:

"The 1992 Los Angeles Civil Disturbance Fires that began on April 29, 1992 were, without question, the most devastating and challenging in the history of Los Angeles and the nation. Given the specific conditions at the fire and rescue scenes, how our firefighters managed to limit the fires to the structures known to date is beyond comprehension I have been informed of numerous testimonies of dramatic and heroic actions committed

"The Los Angeles.. fires that began on April 29... were, without question, the most devastating and challenging in the history of Los Angeles and the nation. "

by or witnessed by our firefighters and paramedics. It is a miracle that only thirty firefighters and paramedics were injured, given the tremendous potential.

"In my view, the true-to-life drama that the city and, indeed, the nation witnessed is a story that must be memorialized. To achieve this will require proper documentation that details specific names of persons and events wherein our firefighters and paramedics, in the performance of their duties at these fires and rescues, performed heroic acts at extreme personal risk" (Los Angeles City Fire Department 1992).

One of the first actions taken by the LAFD was to establish executive command at department headquarters and identify and staff key command positions. The full-service comprehensive command and control system consisted of six key departments:

- Incident Commander (Department Command)
- Command Staff
- Operations Section
- Plans Section
- Logistics Section
- Finance Section

"One of the first actions taken by the LAFD was to establish executive command..."

The information below was compiled from the LAFD's Communications Center (Operations Command), staff reports, command post documentation, individual department members' accounts, and written reports from outside agencies.

The decision to establish department command was a means to prevent the duplication of tasks. The entire operation was managed as a single incident that consolidated command functions and allowed for more effective planning and logistical support.

Executive command structure

The LAFD executive command structure includes:

- Chief Engineer and General Manager - Donald O. Manning
- Deputy Chief, Commander of Operations - Gerald L. Johnson

- Deputy Chief, Commander, Bureau of Fire Suppression and Rescue - Donald F. Anthony
- Deputy Chief, Fire Marshal, Commander, Bureau of Fire Prevention & Public Safety - Davis R. Parsons
- Deputy Chief, Commander of Support Services - Rey T. Rojo
- Chief Paramedic, Commander, Bureau of Emergency Medical Services - Alan R. Cowen

The Incident Command System (ICS)-executing command and control

The Command and Control System focused on four basic elements which contributed to the successful deployment and support of resources.

- Incident, strategy, and tactics
- Resource management through the Incident Command System (ICS)
- Mutual aid coordination
- Communications

In the first thirty-six hours of the disturbance, 6,529 emergency incidents were recorded by the Fire Department's dispatch center; 863 massive structures burned in the 105-square-mile area zone.

Figure 2-2 shows the organization of the LAFD Incident Command System.

Strategy

Four tactical strategies were maintained during the height of the disturbance:

- Prioritize incidents and mitigate the potential for conflagrations
- Protect the city's infrastructure
- Protect exposed buildings, especially habitational structures where incidents exceed available resource capability
- Protect firefighters

"The LAFD has in place a well-honed and frequently exercised ICS," according to William Webster. This system enables the Department to respond quickly and efficiently, both intradepartmental and interagency, to emergency situations. "The ICS was developed in the early 1970s to control and direct resources committed to an inci-

dent. In this manner, incident objectives can be accomplished in priority order. Prior understanding of the ICS, by both LAFD personnel and Mutual Aid officers allowed large numbers of resources" to be efficiently and effectively managed during the civil unrest (Webster 1993).

"The LAFD had prudently updated its standing Tactical Alert plans and attempted to develop event-specific plans for potential unrest following the verdict in the Rodney King trial. The LAFD determined that its riot response would be dependent on police protection. All the planning and training of the LAFD alone, however, is insufficient in situations where firefighters require police protection in order to respond to emergency calls. Under normal conditions, firefighters routinely respond without police protection to emergency calls, however, the civil unrest in April 1992 sharply demonstrated that firefighters simply cannot function without police protection in the face of hostile crowds" (Webster 1993),

At the LAFD's only meeting with the LAPD, the police told the Fire Department that protection of firefighters was the LAPD's third priority-after countersniper activity and barricaded suspects-and that police escorts during the first four to six hours of the disturbance would be provided by local divisions and, thereafter, could be arranged for individual responses. The police believed that any riot would start slowly and would build over several days, as the Watts riots had. The LAPD explained that they had not discussed training or preparation with the National Guard because they did not want to unnecessarily alarm the public or the news media.


The *City in Crisis* also stressed that a significant change must occur in all areas of emergency preparation so that interdepartmental and mutual aid efforts become an integral part of the city's preparation program (Webster and Williams 1992).

Tactics

To ensure the safety of personnel and limit destruction of the city, the LAFD developed many ground tactics to be used as operational guidelines by field commanders, who were given the authority to make decisions based on a given situation. Tactical guidelines were established during the

Figure 2-2

Incident Command System
City of Los Angeles Fire Department



Source: *Historical Accounts of the Los Angeles Civil Disturbance, 1992.*

initial phases of the civil unrest:

- Work in organized groups with police escorts
 - Strike teams
 - Tactical teams
- Hit-and-run firefighting (quickly knock down the fire and move to the next prioritized incident)
- Modify the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS), e.g.
 - No Fire Department personnel on roofs
 - No laddering of buildings
 - Deactivate aerial ladder truck companies in the impact area
 - No overhauling of fires
 - No interior fire attack
 - No air packs

Managing resources

The ICS is a management system designed to control and direct the resources committed to an incident. This system helps to ensure that incident objectives can be accomplished effectively and in order of priority. The need is identified by the first officer on the scene and the procedure is established with the arrival of the basic apparatus from the ICS.

The Incident Commander (IC) is allowed great flexibility in deploying resources. However, beyond the basic functions, the IC implements only those elements of the system that are needed. Use of the ICS to manage the resources assigned to the disturbance proved to be an essential management tool. Prior understanding of the ICS, by both LAFD personnel and mutual aid officers, helped to execute activities in an organized, efficient manner.

During the disturbance, an LAFD helicopter flew to an Army National Guard base in San Luis Obispo, about 125 miles north of Los Angeles, and returned with 300 pieces of body armor. A similar shipment of body armor came from an Air National Guard base south of Los Angeles for distribution to county firefighters and mutual aid companies.

When rioting first broke out, police called on the LAFD to set up a trauma center at its command post at 54th and Arlington to care for the

injured. This command post was a Rapid Transit District (RTD) bus yard, which was both large and safe enough (protected by walls) to house the command function and the EMS/trauma center functions (e.g., staging, refueling tanks, and rehab). During the riots, the LAFD's role quickly changed. As fires broke out, the Incident Command expanded to include a Fire Division along with EMS. The area's mutual aid plan was put into effect and eventually victims were transported directly to area hospitals and not to the trauma centers or specialized facilities.

Because the fire incidents were so widespread, the county, working with the Office of Emergency Services (OES), established its own command post at its headquarters in East Los Angeles to respond to fires not covered by the city. The affected area was divided into five zones. Other county firefighters, dispatched as mutual aid to the city, worked directly with the Arlington ICS; the remainder were under regional command. Firefighters from as far away as the San Francisco Bay area and San Diego responded to the calls for assistance.

Battalion Chief Tim Manning, the first incident commander at the Arlington Command Post, reported, "Recognizing that we had large numbers of structures burning and limited amounts of resources, our strike teams (originally consisting of five engines and a battalion chief but later reduced) were given very specific direction to stop conflagration. We didn't want a single building to spread and take multiple city blocks of structures. Another priority was to stop the fire from progressing and moving to our residential area—recognizing our priority was life, then property. Another issue that we had to address early on was the safety of our personnel" (Lin 1992).

Although the city had a disaster plan in effect for many years, both the city and county were concerned early on about the lack of police escorts for firefighters. Departing Police Chief Daryl Gates later admitted his department had made several mistakes, including waiting too long to call a "tactical alert" to bring in more forces sooner.

Whenever city firefighters needed protection, the police were responsible for coordinating the escort duty. Deputy Chief Davis Parsons stated,

“The way we ultimately managed that . . . we had a fire department battalion chief in the police department command post who was able to work face-to-face with the person in the police department, who would send the message to their staging area to provide the officers and the vehicles necessary. We also provided a battalion chief at the point of dispatch, where the strike team was assembled, so that when the assembled police officers came forward, they had somebody to look for and the two units would be mated and then they would leave” (Lin 1992).

Since the civil unrest, the state has convened several meetings with fire chiefs and law enforcement personnel to improve response time and cooperation between the fire and police departments.

Mutual aid coordination

The Los Angeles Mutual Aid Plan works as follows:

Area A can supply approximately five or six engine companies. If more resources are needed, the region is asked to send assistance; then the Office of Emergency Services, which taps other regions’ resources, is asked. These resources arrive as an entity, under the charge of unit captains and battalion chiefs as strike team leaders. They then fit into the incident command system.

The ongoing riots required the rapid mobilization of resources from the entire State of California. One hundred eighty agencies throughout the state participated for the duration of the civil unrest, mobilizing eighty-five strike teams, which represented 2,000 firefighters from California’s six regions.

“Hit-and-run tactics allowed fire suppression resources to be used to their maximum capabilities in protecting personnel from exposure...”

It must be noted that the use of the Fire Mutual Aid System contributed greatly to the confinement and extinguishment of fires. The system functioned efficiently, as reported in the *City in Crisis*.

The fact that the State Fire Mutual Aid System has frequently been implemented (to combat wildland fires) and uses common terminology validates the importance of interagency preparation, planning, and training (Webster and Williams 1992).

Through the mutual aid system, eighteen additional strike teams entered the city limits and assisted in containing and extinguishing fires. Without their presence, the loss of property would have been significantly greater.

Joint activities with police

The mutual aid system functioned as planned. Following the “not guilty” verdicts in the Rodney King trial, the LAPD began to develop a Field Command Post at the RTD bus yard located at 54th Street and Arlington Avenue and requested Fire Department resources to establish a Medical Command Post.

Initially a paramedic rescue ambulance and engine company were dispatched and a battalion chief was sent to assess the need for additional resources. At 7: 15 p.m., Battalion Chief Timothy V. Manning (Battalion 3) arrived at 54th and Arlington and observed 200 to 300 police officers donning riot gear, loading weapons, and organizing into groups. Battalion Chief Manning determined that the potential existed for a large number of casualties and requested additional resources to develop a medical group. The command post was identified as Arlington IC. As additional resources were responding, Battalion Chief Manning observed several distant fires and molotov cocktails being thrown over the RTD bus compound walls, igniting parked buses.

Several fire suppression companies under the command of Battalion Chief 13 Terrance Manning came under attack as the units responded to a reported structure fire at 68th Street and Normandie Avenue. Battalion Chief Terrance Manning recognized the need to obtain police escorts and directed his units to respond to Arlington IC. At 8:00 p.m., Battalion Chief Timothy Manning expanded his command structure to incorporate a Fire Division, a Police Liaison Officer, and a Staging Officer.

The Fire Department had committed sixty-three companies to the impact area to combat twenty-

four active structure fires. Department command ceased commitment of truck companies into the impact area because of exposure to gunfire and objects hurled at the aerial ladder trucks' tiller operators.

Hit-and-run tactics by firefighters allowed fire suppression resources to be used to their maximum capabilities in protecting personnel from exposure and stopping conflagrations. This tactic allowed losses to occur only within involved structures in order to prevent the fire from spreading to adjacent buildings. The LAFD accomplished its incident objectives in this manner. Field officers were granted the flexibility of deviating from standard SOPS, which allowed them to make critical life-saving decisions.

The *City in Crisis* report recommends that firefighter escort during a civil unrest situation should be exclusive; that is, those units should not be called off escort duty to perform other police functions at the cost of leaving fire resources unprotected. LAPD dispatch and jurisdictional procedures should be adjusted to allow escorts to travel from fire to fire along with the fire resources, without regard to geographical boundaries. Plans should be made for in-field shift changes of LAPD escorts, to avoid leaving fire strike teams unprotected. In addition, the report concurs that the LAPD and LAFD need to develop common communication capabilities.

Caring for personnel in the field

Arlington IC, located in the impact area, presented special logistical and personnel safety issues. Feeding of personnel and establishing mechanical support for the apparatus were critical at this point. Over 3,000 meals were purchased through caterers under contract with the department, and local restaurants and the Red Cross donated food to sustain field personnel. Close coordination with police escorts for moving personnel was necessary. The obscure location of the command post prevented certain support functions and caused companies to move through the impact area to reach the staging area. However, it was necessary to coordinate operations from that location due to the inability to establish police escorts for fire and EMS resources.

The height of the civil disturbance occurred on Thursday, April 30, at 11:00 p.m. The Fire Department had 203 companies committed to the incident, 90 provided through the mutual aid system, including 18 strike teams. A total of 950 line fire-suppression and EMS personnel were committed to the incident by this time. EMS resources were dispatched into the impact areas from the Arlington Medical Group, the Fremont Medical Group, and OCD, the city's operation control dispatch center. The following figures indicate the number of incidents handled by the two medical groups:

Arlington Medical Group

471 incidents

146 patient transports

Fremont Medical Group

14 incidents

6 patient transports

Figure 2-3 summarizes the occurrence of civil disturbance-related critical injuries over the five-day period.


In order to provide personnel with an acceptable level of security, actions were taken to group resources, provide law enforcement escorts, and equip each individual with body armor. Due to violent attacks on Fire Department personnel, all strike teams leaving the Arlington IC were to be accompanied by police escorts; however, a bottleneck occurred while dispatching the staged strike teams due to a lack of police escorts. All on-duty LAFD personnel (stationed in the most violent areas of the city) were provided with body armor. Continuous efforts were made to procure more from the Army National Guard's Reserve Base in San Luis Obispo and the Los Alamitos Air Force Reserve Center in Seal Beach.

Air reconnaissance

Air reconnaissance missions were executed to establish the true boundaries of the disturbance and to prevent the duplication of dispatches to the same incidents.

Figure 2-3

Civil Disturbance Related Critical Injuries
April 29 - May 3, 1992



Source: *Historical Accounts of the Los Angeles Civil Disturbance, 1992.*

Communications

The LAFD uses an eighteen-channel 800 MHz radio system to dispatch resources and to provide communication access from unit to unit. During normal operations, two channels are used to dispatch fire units throughout the city.

Anticipating the magnitude of the civil unrest, department command had predetermined that the metropolitan area could be split by incorporating an additional dispatch channel for that area. At approximately 8:00 p.m. on April 29, the radio plan for the city's metropolitan area was implemented and Channel 9 was devoted to the 105-square-mile impact area. This allowed OCD to communicate with units operating in the initial impact area of the disturbance on a separate channel. This placement limited the radio traffic on various OCD dispatch channels and proved beneficial to the Fire Department.

Faced with an inundation of calls, the OCD, at the direction of Deputy Chief Anthony and the field commanders, took the following steps to coordinate communication:

1. Divisions 1 and 2 were split, and each assigned its own dispatch area responsibility and radio frequency.
2. Division 2, where most of the rioting was taking place, was further divided into command posts where resources could be safely managed and deployed independent of OCD.
3. Communication Van 1 was dispatched to the command post at 54th and Arlington, and was eventually staffed with experienced dispatchers.
4. The OCD computer was set in "degraded mode" (earthquake mode), which resulted in the dispatching of only one company per incident, thereby conserving resources city-wide.
5. Citywide tactical alert procedures were established.
6. Fire companies and EMS resources in the impact areas were formed into strike teams, each under a common command, and were dispatched as a unit.

LAFD staff was involved extensively in EOC activities, including providing and exchanging

information with various agencies, providing a communications link with different agencies, coordinating escorts, procuring body armor, providing relief of members, satisfying logistical needs, and serving assisting agencies.

Media and press relations

Shortly after the outbreak of violence, Battalion Chief Dean Cathey, LAFD Community Liaison Officer, contacted Chief Engineer Manning to consult with him on the effects of the developing situation, and a media strategy was developed and successfully implemented. It provided the media and the police with an accurate picture of what firefighters and paramedics faced. The media strategy changed from harsh and frequent criticisms of the Fire Department during the early hours of the civil disturbance to more complimentary and even laudatory comments later that night and in the days following.

During the first three days of the disturbance, over 150 interviews were conducted by the Fire Department's spokespersons with print, radio, and television news media. Many of these interviews were broadcast nationwide and to Europe, the United Kingdom, and Australia.

The LAPD's response

Through community meetings and citywide telephone surveys, the authors of the *City in Crisis* found that the public perceived much of the blame for the inadequacies in the planning and preparation for civil disorder was directed at the LAPD and that much of the blame aimed at the LAPD was justified. The planning failures were not limited to the LAPD but extended broadly across the city's political structure and to the highest offices of the city government. In general, the city failed to prioritize its procedures—a critical process.

Priorities must be established. Are the priorities to rescue victims, to protect firefighters, to arrest looters, to contain a rioting crowd, or to secure certain vulnerable and important facilities? These are some of the competing demands for police services that arise in the context of unrest. The extent of the LAPD's planning for a department-wide response to civil unrest was limited to the

Tactical Manual and the “standing plans” of the police. The *Tactical Manual* only mentions that it is the responsibility of the person holding a particular position to develop plans to respond to a certain situation. It assumes there will be time to devise a plan once the action starts.

TAMPA-A CASE STUDY OF A MID-SIZED CITY

“Tampa is the city where the good life gets better for many. It is also the city where the bad life gets worse for some,” according to Bob Gilder, a longtime NAACP leader in the city. “Tampa’s central city neighborhoods are getting poorer, blacker, and younger, and a dearth of role models has led to the exit of the black middle class from the older neighborhoods.” In addition, federal budget cutbacks have left fewer ways for the poor to help themselves.

The bustling metropolis of Tampa experienced a series of civil disturbances during 1987 which raised public attention nationwide. These incidents were sparked by racial tension in the poorer neighborhoods over the controversial death of Melvin Hair, a twenty-three-year-old mentally disturbed man accused of threatening his family with a knife. Mr. Hair was the third of several black men killed in confrontations with white officers in 1987. Racial disturbances were mostly restricted to twelve city blocks around the College Hill low-income housing project where Melvin Hair lived and died.

On the night that Mr. Hair died, the lead story on the local television news was about a newly released report by the city attorney blaming New York Mets pitcher Dwight Gooden (who is black) for starting a widely publicized melee with white Tampa police officers in December 1986. This encounter left Gooden swollen and bruised. As the evening news continued, the teens hanging out at the street corner (where medics had been unable to revive Hair) grew angrier and angrier about what happened to Hair and Gooden, a neighborhood hero who grew up a few doors away. Someone set fire to a dumpster, and a crowd gathered and soon became a mob. Rock-and-bottle throwing started, leaving ten people injured and eighteen arrested, mainly juveniles.

Nearly one-quarter of black Tampons live in public housing projects in Hillsborough County, including the College Hill and Ponce de Leon complexes. The population of the nine census tracts where these projects are located increased by 17 percent from 1970 to 1985-twice the rate of increase in other black neighborhoods. In those tracts, 4 of 10 residents are under the age of eighteen, compared to 2.4 of 10 for Tampa as a whole. The black middle class has moved from this section of Tampa to what are newer black, neighborhoods; while the whites who lived there moved to the suburbs.

Few federally funded social services remain in this “other” Tampa. Most that were cut have not been replaced by local or state efforts.’ Jobless rates among youth are critically high. According to the State Labor Department, unemployment for black males, ages sixteen to twenty-four, is four to five times the overall rate and twice the rate among white males in the same age group. Even more black females in the age group are without work.

In this section of Tampa, the police are often viewed as a hostile force that does not distinguish between criminals and other residents. The death of Melvin Hair on February 18 was the spark that ignited a fire that had been smoldering for months. (The choke hold that was used to subdue Hair and which caused his death has since been banned by the Tampa Police Department.) Protests continued throughout the year. Several police officers and firefighters were injured in violent encounters, which alerted the city to the urgency of its social problems. Police reported the following series of events:

Thursday morning, February 20, many students gathered to create disturbances and conspired to open fire on police on Friday or Saturday night. A local grocery store was looted, several houses occupied by whites and a McDonald’s restaurant were struck with rocks and broken into, and threats were made on people’s lives.

Police at 18th Street and East Buffalo Avenue activated a command post in the area and fire department supervisors joined them soon after. Police officers were advised that all evening shifts would be held over. The roads were closed after

several news personnel were attacked and injured. The media was later advised that if they entered the restricted area they would not receive police protection. Incidents escalated as fire bombs were thrown at police and houses were rocked. Groups of thirty to forty people, armed with rocks and bottles, looted stores. Two people were arrested, fighting broke out in the streets, and shots were fired. As the violence escalated, other groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, began to protest. In view of the increasing unrest, two additional phone lines were installed the next day at the command post. Police responded to continued incidents of looting and the beating of a white couple who were dragged from their car, which was later demolished.

In police reports of two separate incidents later in October, two young black females were attacked and run off the road by white females. There were six incidents of rock-and-bottle throwing in the area of 22nd Street and Lake. Police received approximately forty calls related to incidents in the area. Major thoroughfares were ordered closed and four midnight squads were deployed from neighboring districts to stage a field-force formation to control the area.

Fire and police personnel worked effectively together during this civil unrest. Firefighters were attacked with rocks while attempting to put out vehicle and building fires; two police officers were later assigned to the fire station for security. Police displayed a greater show of force and armed themselves with riot gear to confront the crowds. This show of force, combined with the arrival of black community leaders on the scene, helped to bring the situation under control. During this incident, one police officer and two firefighters were injured, and six police units were damaged.

In another incident in 1989, a suspect in a soured undercover drug bust resisted arrest in a violent struggle with two undercover officers after an informant made a drug buy in the College Hill housing area. The suspect died while in custody, after a delay in treatment during the ensuing disturbance. A crowd of about 150 youths hurled rocks, torched and looted a grocery store, and fired two shotgun blasts at a news van during an

hour-long disturbance. Officials cordoned off four intersections in the twenty-two-block housing development and summoned 100 police officers.

Steps taken to remedy Tampa's situation

This section of Tampa now is receiving more attention from government officials. Calls have come to increase the number of black police officers (now 9 percent of the police force) to more closely reflect Tampa's 24 percent black population. Mayor Sandy Freeman promised that this goal would be accomplished. The critical need is to address these issues before the city experiences widespread conflict in a far greater magnitude than just sporadic incidents. Federal officials said the city could better prepare for racial disturbances by monitoring community activities that might trigger turmoil. Black civil rights leaders continue to scramble for support for aid programs and the city plans an expanded summer jobs program. More black police officers and an independent panel to review complaints against police are among twenty-three steps the U.S. Justice Department suggested to diffuse Tampa's racial tensions. More than half of the suggestions, many of which involve police, are already in place (*Washington Post*, March 9, 1987).

Suggestions concerning the Police Department include wider community involvement, recruitment of more blacks and other minorities, establishment of goals to ensure that blacks and other minorities are represented in command ranks, increased service training and human-relations courses, and training and simulation exercises for response to crowd disorder.

Police called meetings to coordinate general emergency preparedness, and representatives of the Tampa fire and police departments, the Hillsborough County Sheriff's office, and the Florida National Guard all attended. These meetings were prompted by a U.S. Justice Department recommendation to review training programs on law enforcement response to crowd disorder (*Miami Herald*, March 4, 1987).

VIRGINIA BEACH-A CASE STUDY OF A SMALL COMMUNITY

Background to the 1989 disturbance

In 1981 a small group of students from Virginia's mostly black colleges gathered for a Labor Day celebration in the exclusive residential coastal community of Croatan Beach, approximately two miles south of the more commercially oriented Virginia Beach community. Theodore Holloway, a concert promoter, sponsored an event at the Dome, a Virginia Beach hall, which was attended without incident by 500 students.

By the mid- 1980s, this had grown into an annual event. The loosely organized gathering in Croatan Beach had grown immensely through "word-of-mouth" and Holloway's entrepreneurial design to organize events based on the image of black Greek-letter fraternities and sororities, the center of many black students' social lives. This connection to the Greek-letter chapters helped make the event a national black student attraction.

In 1986, approximately 8,000 people attended the Croatan Beach Labor Day party. Holloway sponsored a "Greekfest '86, Step Show and Party" at the Dome, The hall was filled to capacity with 1,800 students, with an additional 2,000 outside unable to gain admittance. Some minor pushing and shoving began among the frustrated crowd outside.

Holloway recalled that after the pushing and shoving began, the local police showed up in force, which he called "unnecessary." He attributed this force to the police and the community's misunderstanding of the activities of the fraternities and sororities.

After the 1986 Labor Day gathering, Croatan Beach officials and residents, now concerned with the growing numbers of revelers, requested that the event be held in the larger area of Virginia Beach. In November, city officials met with representatives of participating universities and neighborhood civic groups, and it was decided that Croatan Beach was no longer a suitable venue for the celebration.

September 1987

Thousands of students gathered for Labor Day

weekend at the oceanfront beaches. About 300 remained at Croatan Beach. Promoter Holloway moved the event to the 7,500-capacity Pavilion and expanded it to two nights. No major problems were reported.

City officials sent letters to local universities and Pan Hellenic councils after agreeing that students would be directed again to oceanfront beaches the next year. The Pavilion was rented to the promoter for a third night of events.

September 1988

The third night at the Pavilion drew an above-capacity crowd of 9,000, an additional 3,000 gathered outside. The facility was damaged and minor injuries occurred when people rushed the doors. Traffic gridlock prevented Fire Department emergency vehicles from reaching the building.

Police reported disorderly behavior, throwing of bottles and other missiles at police from hotels, and confrontations between crowd and hotel/motel employees over parking in private lots.

Later, city officials met with promoter Holloway and agreed to ban use of the Pavilion for future Greekfest gatherings.

Preparing for future confrontations

By 1988, the festival was viewed by attendees as a "black" event. It attracted both college students and nonstudents, as well as a small group of "undesirables." After the 1988 Labor Day weekend, city merchants circulated a petition calling for a prohibition of Greekfest in 1989; the City Council passed three ordinances expanding police power over public gatherings and behavior. City officials and national black community leaders were unable to arrange meetings to discuss issues raised by Greekfest '88, each side blaming the other for not following through. The city government hired a former Washington, D.C., deputy police chief to advise the police force on crowd control procedures.

On August 15, 1989, the Governor's chief of staff met with city officials to discuss the possible deployment of the National Guard during the Labor Day weekend. A week later, Virginia Beach Chief of Police Charles Wall appeared on local cable television and announced that the Police

Department was prepared to address any riot situation which might arise. The National Guard would be readily available, if needed. On Friday, August 31, at the request of Virginia Beach city officials, Governor Gerald L. Baliles signed an Executive Order placing the National Guard on standby status for traffic and crowd patrol. As expected, a major disturbance took place (*Virginian-pilot, Ledger Star, Washington Post* 1989).

The role of the Fire Department

Chief Harry Diezel of the Virginia Beach Fire Department reported to the Civil Unrest Task Force that 28 percent of those arrested during the disturbance were white, although Greekfest is a black Greek-letter event. The police viewed the role of firefighters as incidental. "Firefighters were referred to as 'redheaded stepchildren'," according to Chief Diezel. The Fire Department had no "buckstep operators," and there were no plans to protect firefighters from the crowds, who were hostile to anyone in uniform.

Chief Diezel reported that Virginia Beach had no formal mutual aid agreements and no police protection was planned for the firefighters. Many firefighters left the scene when the crowds gathered and showed hostility towards them.

ANATOMY OF A RIOT

Civil unrest can generally be attributed to extreme frustrations arising out of an atmosphere of social and economic oppression. When these feelings of oppression are left unabated, the atmosphere for unrest develops and smolders until triggered, usually by a single, isolated incident.

The late James Hundley, Jr., assistant professor of the Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, in a paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association in 1967, identified five general factors that must be present in a community before civil unrest occurs :

1. Those concerned "must perceive that a crisis exists. "
2. Community members must perceive that all reasonable channels for bringing about effective change are closed to them, for example,

no representation in the local government and/or lack of support and protection from the police.

3. Community members must believe that rioting and violence will force those in authority to listen to and heed their demands. For many rioters, this stage is reached because they have simply taken all they can and do not know what else to do, or they no longer care.
4. The community must be relatively close-knit. (This point is arguable, since this was not the case in the 1992 Los Angeles riots.)
5. There must be a substantial breakdown in previously accepted relationships between police and fire personnel and the community.

Hundley further listed four main factors that could be immediate causes for rioting:

1. The creation and circulation of rumors offering a riot as one solution or possibility.
2. The occurrence of a given event that typifies the kinds of complaints and grievances that a community has.
3. The convergence of large numbers of people around a precipitating event.
4. The communication of specific grievances throughout the forming crowd so that definite courses of action emerge and are followed among a substantial number of the converging crowd (Hundley 1967).

The 1968 Kerner Commission (President Lyndon Johnson's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, formed in 1967) cited the news media as having a significant impact on civil disturbances.

The news media are an important factor in influencing an already tense situation by often inadvertently acting as provocateur. "*One definite effect of the media seems to be the determination in time and place that latent tensions will surface into disorder*" (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968). For example, during the 1992 trial of the four officers accused in the Rodney King beating, the television news media continually aired the videotape showing King being beaten by police officers while lying on the ground, apparently helpless. This incited public

opinion of police brutality. Television images of the riots following the verdict further exacerbated the situation.

Live reports of police activity alerted disruptive groups to the locations of unprotected areas where they engaged in looting and other criminal activity. In some instances, persons not normally inclined to such behavior were provoked by these reports simply because the opportunity now existed.

Causes of civil unrest

Historically, civil unrest in the U.S. has been undertaken for a variety of purposes: disputes over exploitation of workers, substandard living conditions, lack of political representation, poor health care and education, lack of employment opportunities, and racial issues, among others. These underlying causes have been widely documented.

Brief descriptions of seven significant civil disorders of the 20th century are presented below.

East St. Louis, 1917. Labor disputes in the industrial slum of East St. Louis caused employers to import black laborers in an effort to cut labor costs and break strikes. Angry white workers retaliated by burning buildings and attacking blacks. On one occasion, a carload of whites drove through a black district, shooting into homes—the residents retaliated. When police arrived to investigate, driving a car similar to the perpetrators', neighborhood residents mistakenly fired upon it and killed two police officers. Rioting began again the next day. Three hundred buildings were destroyed and forty-eight people were killed.

Chicago, 1919. Racial tensions ran extremely high in post-war Chicago during the summer of 1919. On July 27, a young black boy swimming in Lake Michigan accidentally crossed the imaginary line separating the “black beach” from the “white beach.” The boy was stoned and drowned. Police refused to arrest the attackers but did arrest one black on a white’s complaint. In the seven days of rioting, 38 persons were killed, 500 injured, and 1,000 left homeless.

Harlem, 1935. The nature of race riots changed significantly in Depression-ravished Harlem of 1935. Previous riots had pitted whites against blacks. In the Harlem riot of 1935, black residents directed their hostility toward white-owned establishments and the police, who they viewed as an “army of occupation” in their community.

A week before the March 19 riot started, a black male was beaten by police and lost an eye in the assault. The man was arrested and charged with felonious assault, but a grand jury refused to indict him. On March 19, a sixteen-year-old black youth was arrested for allegedly stealing a knife from an E. H. Kress store (a major holdout against hiring blacks). The rumor of police brutality spread and a riot erupted—over 200 stores were ransacked and looted—property damage was reported at \$2 million. New York City Mayor LaGuardia appointed a commission to investigate the causes of the riot. “Existing economic and social forces created a state of emotional tension . . . As long as the economic and social forces which were responsible for that condition operate, a state of tension will exist in Harlem and recurrent outbursts may occur.”

Watts, 1965. Over a week of rioting was triggered in the Watts district of Los Angeles by the arrest of a black motorist in the area, leaving 34 people dead and over 1,000 injured. Nearly 3,800 people were arrested, and property damages were put at \$40 million. An official report criticized by black leaders placed some of the blame for the riots on the growing civil rights movement. Two more people were killed when disturbances flared again in Watts in early 1966.

Detroit, 1967. Forty-three people died after a week of rioting devastated the nation’s fifth largest city. Federal troops were deployed for the first time since 1943 to quell the unrest. A police raid on a “blind pig” (after-hours bar) on the largely black West Side triggered the trouble. Damage was estimated at \$200 million, arrests topped 7,000, and over 2,000 people were injured. This was one of the riots that prompted the creation of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission).

Miami, 1980. Three days of rioting in the Liberty City section of Miami were touched off after an all-white jury acquitted four former Miami police officers of the fatal beating of a black insurance executive. Eighteen people died, over 400 were injured, and 1,100 arrests were made. Damages were estimated at \$200 million.

Washington, D.C., 1991. The worst violence in the nation's capital since 1968 broke out in the largely Hispanic Mount Pleasant section after the shooting of a Hispanic man by a female police officer.

What are the elements that set the stage for civil disorder? The Kerner Commission Report cites poverty and other social factors, as well as racial discrimination, as major causes. However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the key factor in actual riotous confrontation is the community's relationship to law enforcement and other local officials.

The belief in many inner cities is that police harassment and intimidation are the norm and not the exception. When a riot erupts, the police are the immediate target. This view is easily and very often transferred to other uniformed personnel, including firefighters and EMS personnel entering a riot zone, even though their purpose is to bring aid.

This report aims to address the need to develop and institute measures to mitigate civil unrest situations and to quickly and effectively quell those disturbances which cannot be prevented. The key aspects to consider in bringing civil disturbances under control include:

- Mitigation
- Preparedness/Planning
- Response
- Recovery

3

MITIGATION



W. A. Bridges/*Atlanta Journal Constitution*

3

MITIGATION

Mitigation basically implies efforts to prevent or minimize the damage which can result from civil unrest. These efforts can be developed using lessons learned from previous civil disturbances in large, medium, and small cities, as cited in the case studies above.

Mitigation can take place both during preparation for a potential disaster and during recovery from a crisis. The aim, at all times, is to reduce risk through anticipating actions. However, the level of intensity, catastrophe, and destructiveness of civil unrest occurrences are often difficult to predict. Thus, mitigation can only be accomplished through instituting programs to cope with potential disruption or destruction of physical and social networks between agencies and the community.

PRIORITIZATION

It is essential that agencies jointly study previous civil unrest situations to identify any common predictors of the probability of reoccurrence. This will be useful to them in prioritizing their response actions based on previous activity in a similar environment. Common predictors include such

scenarios as a prevalence of youth gangs with no planned agendas and gangs with members who have no involvement in community projects to occupy their time. Other common predictors include a lack of social services to meet the needs of community residents, a large presence of a minority group without local services to help integrate them into the community, and a significant rise in unemployment in the community.

“It is essential that agencies jointly study previous unrest situations to identify any common predictors of the probability of their reoccurrence.”

PLANNING

An incident command system (ICS) should be defined and implemented in both fire/EMS and police agencies. The agencies should develop the flexibility to adopt this mode immediately, without confusion or conflict, and the unified police/fire

command should extend to the policy level. Policies and procedures for joint ventures should be developed, approved, and accepted by all agencies involved, in order to clearly establish responsibilities and avoid discrepancies and disagreements during the crisis. These policies and procedures may take the form of standard operating procedures (SOPS) and mutual aid agreements, which may incorporate other agencies, such as hospitals, federal law enforcement agencies, the military, the district attorney's office, the mayor and other officials, and agencies in other jurisdictions.

ADDRESSING TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES

Field experience has demonstrated that there are two parallel aspects to emergency incident management-technical and political. Technical aspects include the establishment of command and the creation of operational sectors with identified and defined key roles. The political aspects primarily pertain to the interpersonal and organizational dynamics of incident management that tend to be downplayed in many fire departments and more emphasized in police agencies. Traditionally, the administration and management of governmental organizations are

“Field experience has demonstrated .two parallel aspects to emergency incident management-technical and political.”

influenced by political considerations. Politics also influence the administration and management of an ICS, with particular emphasis on organizational dynamics, conflict, compromise, and communications. Political considerations also play a part in the management of an emergency. The most expedient time to address political issues is during the planning stage, where the primary concerns usually are “Do we meet the requirements of the law?” and “Can our personnel perform the duties that we expect of them?”

Inter- and intra-agency problems are created where there is lack of communication prior to an emergency-i.e., the key players and their emergency response missions related to civil disturbances are not identified or known-and everyone believes their specific agendas or interests are the most important. The ability to mount a safe and effective response is directly related to what is accomplished during the planning stages.

“Agencies must share intelligence.”

BUILDING STRONG RELATIONSHIPS AMONG AGENCIES

No single agency can effectively manage a sizeable disturbance. Planning for an emergency requires the resources and expertise of law enforcement, EMS, the fire service, and other local public agencies. It also requires becoming familiar with operational procedures carried out by key players in these agencies.

Agencies must share intelligence. For example, if police know that rock concert attendees have the propensity to commit arson, they should share this information with the fire department. Critical issues to be addressed through intelligence gathering include:

- The probability of civil unrest
- Capability assessments required
- Legal ramifications to be determined
- Existing mutual aid agreements which may need to be reviewed, fine-tuned, and rehearsed, as necessary
- Floor plans of buildings and other information which may help police devise effective tactical maneuvers, e.g.,
 - information relating to hazardous materials
 - identification of everything in the impact zone that could affect tactical plans

Emergency declaration policy guidelines should be established (these can be fine-tuned during preparation for civil unrest), to define such matters as alert phases for different levels of activity. A

policy group made up of political representatives, with agency personnel acting in advisory capacities, can be established to formulate these guidelines.

Planning activities should also include measures for relief, feeding, and medical attention.

Operational Plans

- Identify vendors who will provide emergency equipment, food, and medical accoutrements. Special arrangements should be made to ensure there are no shortages of these necessities.
- Clean up and reduce likely sources of fire loads (e.g., old cars, trash, and abandoned buildings).
- Mandate sprinklers in all new construction. All agencies may want to solicit political help to ensure this. Retrofit is encouraged in all older buildings. (City of Los Angeles 1992)

COMMUNICATIONS

A strong communications infrastructure should be established among the fire department, the police department, and the media. The Kerner Commission made several recommendations regarding the media's involvement in civil unrest during the late 1960s. A wide range of interviews with government officials, law enforcement authorities, media personnel, and other citizens (including ghetto residents), as well as a quantitative analysis of riot coverage and a special conference with industry representatives, led the commission members to conclude that:

- “Despite instances of sensationalism, inaccuracy, and distortion, newspapers, radio, and television tried, on the whole, to give a balanced, factual account of the 1967 disorders.
- “Elements of the news media failed to portray accurately the scale and character of the violence that occurred last summer (1967). The overall effect was, we believe, an exaggeration of both mood and event.
- “Important segments of the media failed to report adequately on the causes and consequences of civil disorders and on the underlying problems of race relations. They have

not communicated to the majority of their audience -which is white-a sense of the degradation, misery, and hopelessness of life in the ghetto.”

In addition to more balanced coverage of “the Negro community,” the Commission recommended that the media improve coordination with police through advance planning in reporting riot news, cooperate with the police in the designation of police information officers, establish information centers, and develop mutually acceptable guidelines for riot reporting and conduct of media personnel (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968).

Since the publication of the Kerner Commission Report over twenty-five years ago, the media has adopted a new and less patronizing approach to covering civil disorders. They have adopted a more balanced account of the causes and results of civil disturbances. The media and police and fire departments have developed guidelines by which to work cooperatively during civil disturbances. The creation of the post of Public Information Officer (PIO) is the key to improving relations among police and fire/EMS departments and the media. The PIO must be well-informed, charismatic, and experienced in public relations. The messages conveyed by this individual are often vital to the mitigation of civil disturbances. The PIO can work with the media to alleviate the public's often hostile view of law enforcement officers and to publicize the important and extensive work carried on by the police, fire, and EMS services.

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN POLICE AND FIRE AGENCIES

Communication often proves to be the controlling element in assessing whether a civil disturbance will quickly dissipate or intensify. Each jurisdiction must decide whether its agencies should replace their separate communication systems and build a single, more efficient one, or whether their present systems are compatible and need only to be updated or modified. A unified dispatch system must be in place and ready for operation on short notice, as needed. Ideally, this system would be

located in the ICS headquarters.

The Public Information Officer is invaluable to ensuring good communications in the event of a civil disturbance. The PIO would participate in all meetings and decisions regarding the civil unrest situation and would act as official liaison to the public and media on behalf of each agency.

COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

One type of communications equipment which could prove to be invaluable during a civil disorder is the cellular telephone. Agency executives may desire to enter into special arrangements with cellular telephone companies to provide this equipment to its personnel. Cellular phones could be helpful to firefighters working long shifts in secluded areas to keep them in touch with their incident commanders and families, as it becomes necessary.

Compatible radio communication frequencies should be carefully researched and tested for effectiveness, to ensure that agencies are able to communicate with one another (e.g., portable radios).

TRAINING

Fire and law enforcement agencies should work closely with local legislators and government officials to maintain or increase funding for joint training programs. These programs, if carried out on a regular schedule, would enhance the effectiveness of firefighters and officers in all facets of their field work.

“Media personnel should be included in certain aspects of training to ensure that the public has an understanding of how agencies operate to avoid civil disorder.”

A civil disturbance requires a police department to adopt a military model, which creates stressful situations within the organization and in its relationships with other agencies. For example, during riot situations, police officers are often faced with a conflict between their normal autonomous roles and the requirement to follow precise unit

directives. Conflicts over authority frequently arise between fire departments and National Guard units. Many problems experienced by police during disturbances stem from organizational alterations.

Joint training exercises among police, fire/EMS, and public works personnel are essential to alerting them to circumstances that could lead to civil disorder and to measures that can be taken to prevent the development of an explosive situation. Media personnel should be included in certain aspects of training to ensure that the public has an understanding of how agencies operate to avoid civil unrest. These exercises should be designed to cover:

- Life safety priorities
- General guidelines (SOPS) for dealing with civil unrest
- Coordination of tactical activities
- Detailed explanation of police/fire goals
- Coordination of a unified dispatch system
- Delineated span of control of each agency
- Police control procedure
- Operation of the integrated command system
- Operation of the integrated communication system
- Task force approach to dealing with civil unrest
- Media briefing
- Cultural sensitivity training
- Legal issues
- Mutual aid systems

CULTURAL SENSITIVITY TRAINING

The Mesa, Arizona, Fire Department (MFD) is one example of a fire department in the forefront of actively addressing the needs of cultural diversity in the community. With a diverse population, Mesa’s city staff, mirroring the make-up of its citizens, chose to be proactive in diversity issues.

MFD is a high-profile agency—the public sees it working fire and emergency medical calls as well as teaching and helping in the community. The city’s affirmative action policy helped MFD quickly organize its multicultural awareness program. The goal of this long-established policy is to achieve “a representation in the city’s workforce

that mirrors the community.” MFD shares that goal and worked to rectify deficiencies, such as the lack of minorities and females in mid- and upper-level management.

Workforce 2000, the Hudson Institute report, estimates that by the year 2000, 70 percent of the available workforce will be minorities and women (Johnston and Packer 1987). To tap this resource, MFD began a long-term effort which includes orientation, education, training, and active recruiting. MFD reached a consensus on these issues after facing earlier problems and recent court decisions on so-called “reverse discrimination.” MFD’s approach is to identify immediate problem areas. The three greatest obstacles faced by potential recruits were Emergency Medical Technical (EMT) certification, lack of minority applications, and the testing process, including written, physical agility, and oral boards.

Since the MFD requires applicants to be EMT-certified, the strategy was to enroll qualified minorities in college-level EMT classes. Community colleges agreed to offer more EMT classes and preparatory courses for employment and promotion. To remedy the lack of minority applicants, area high-school personnel pledged to support the effort. Handouts, aimed at junior high school students, show cultural diversity on the job and include language that is nonsexist and not gender specific. By allowing students to see what firefighting entails, MFD feels the new focus and incentive may help some students succeed who normally would not.

The fire-service testing process can be an obstacle for many. MFD is working to ensure that the process is not culturally biased. To assist applicants, the department’s orientation program explains the entire testing procedure. MFD emphasizes that all programs ensure equal opportunity for all applicants, especially the physical agility test, which has been the biggest obstacle for female applicants.

The department began an exercise program to help applicants increase their physical fitness. Aimed primarily at women, any applicant may participate in the program. Formerly, once the testing process was completed, the applicants were ignored. Today, the Personnel Division, along

with the MFD, tracks the results, and specific testing problems for minorities and females are noted. To assist applicants who need guidance, the department developed a “Fire Department Entry Level Preparation” class which will be taught at local community colleges.

Joint fire/police venture

A recruiting team made up of personnel from all ranks assisted in locating possible applicants for MFD and, thus, were able to communicate with more people on a personal level. Mesa’s Police Department pioneered this concept, and today recruiting is a joint fire/police venture. The recruiting team studied the affirmative action plan and is familiar with all aspects of the MFD, the “do’s and don’ts” of recruiting, and applicant qualifications.

Communicating with the community

Twelve percent of Mesa’s population is Hispanic and many do not speak English. Because MFD personnel could not effectively communicate with them, especially in emergency situations, the city instituted a Spanish-proficiency certification program. Conversational Spanish classes offered to firefighters include terminology that will be helpful in emergency situations as well as sensitivity to cultural differences.

These programs would not work without inter-departmental cooperation, management guidance, organized labor participation, open communications, inclusion of community colleges, and public relations. Through these combined efforts, MFD is changing its workforce to promote not only compliance with the law, but effective, relevant service to the community (Knutson and Note 1992).

OPERATIONS ISSUES

Fire and law enforcement agencies can work cooperatively to prevent civil unrest throughout the nation. Specific plans to address the following issues should be developed:

- Sale of liquor during civil unrest
- Sale of gasoline and explosive materials
- Removal of rubbish and all extraneous materials which could be used as weapons

- Fine-tuning of joint exercises among agencies

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

The primary aim of mitigation is to reduce risk through anticipating actions. Community relations may prove to be the most valuable mitigation effort in the prevention of civil unrest. Community activities should include:

- Preparing land-use and development plans for hazardous areas
- Educating decision makers and community representatives about the risk of civil unrest and circumstances that can cause civil unrest

Public service announcements and campaigns are good maintenance tools to adopt to keep the community involved in government and to remind people that these agencies exist to protect and help them.

Agencies need to support community leaders and to include them in regular and comprehensive briefings on agency policies and activities. The accumulation of unresolved grievances by residents, coupled with a minor police action such as a simple arrest, can easily be perceived as explosive enough to spark a riot situation. Local gangs usually include influential leaders who are accorded much respect and authority within their communities. Harnessing this leadership can help bring harmony to the community and enable local fire and police departments to interact with the gangs through innovative programs and social events that will make them an important and productive part of the community (see Part 6, Recovery).

Recent civil disturbances have demonstrated that community-oriented programs connect the public with fire and police. Increased public awareness promotes changes in attitude toward fire and police personnel. Public support is essential when agencies and their personnel become the target of rioters, as was the case in Los Angeles.

Agencies can implement various programs designed to build trust and develop a partnership with the community through:

- Dialogue/town meetings
- Networking with community leaders
- Community relations assistants, who monitor

the vital signs of the community and report directly to the chief executives

- Hotlines, which are set up immediately before, during, and after civil unrest
- Designating “safe places” sponsored by the fire and/or police departments to carry on community activities, such as food drives, clean-up programs, child-care services, and fund-raising drives for other services to respond to specific community needs
- Establishing cultural sensitivity workshops for agency executives, officers, and other personnel. When properly conducted, these programs can enhance police/community relations
- Recruiting culturally diverse personnel
- Strengthening media relations
- Establishing a public access system, possibly through the PIO (ideally, direct access to chief executives of both police and fire agencies)

SPRINKLER SYSTEMS

All local government agencies should cooperate in the development of comprehensive plans for the installation of sprinkler systems. Operational sprinkler systems have proven to be highly effective in saving property and, thus, millions of dollars in damage from arson and other fire-related actions. In its report on the Los Angeles riots, the Fire Sprinkler Advisory Board (FSAB) of Southern California reported on the effectiveness of automatic fire sprinkler systems. The FSAB reports that more than 5,000 fires were reported during the riots.

“Operational sprinkler systems have proven to be highly effective in saving property and, thus, millions of dollars in damage from arson and other fire-related actions.”

Because firefighters were often blocked from reaching their destinations by angry mobs, the automatic sprinkler systems were the only means of controlling these blazes. Those buildings

lacking sprinklers sustained heavy losses (FSAB 1992). A five-year study by Factory Mutual Systems (1980-1984) concluded that the average fire loss in a fully sprinklered building was approximately \$38,000, while a non-sprinklered building of the same size showed an average loss of approximately \$315,000. This reflects an eight-

fold dollar loss above that of a sprinkler-protected building. A more recent study revealed similar data, with losses in a sprinklered building averaging \$147,429 versus \$1,603,200 in a non-sprinklered building (dollar values are indexed to the 1991 dollar value). (Fire Sprinkler Advisory Board 1992.)

4

PREPAREDNESS



W. A. Bridges/*Atlanta Journal Constitution*

4

PREPAREDNESS

HOW POLICE CHIEFS AND FIRE CHIEFS WORKED TOGETHER

During the course of their deliberations, the Task Force on Civil Unrest developed the following lists, prepared by each agency (fire and police), which outline a two-way flow of actions and data/information in response to a given situation. The lists appear in order of priority.

Fire Personnel-support expected from the Police Department

1. Protection of fire personnel, both en route and on the scene
2. Information regarding resource capabilities of police personnel
3. Accurate, up-to-date intelligence briefings
4. Better communications/coordination with police, at all levels
5. Knowledge of police needs from fire personnel
6. Joint training on incident command, according to accepted and agreed upon standards
7. Delineation of each agency's responsibilities (who is in charge of what)

8. Financial responsibilities of each department

Police Personnel-support expected from the Fire Department

1. Protection of police personnel (by EMS/rescue)
2. Realistic expectations, based on resources available
3. Immediate liaison-sharing between fire/EMS and police
4. Intelligence liaisons
5. Sharing of critical information-floor plans, elevators, etc.
6. Joint training on incident command and other issues (exercises)
7. Mutual aid agreements between police and fire personnel, a.k.a. Emergency Operation Plan (EOP)

PRIORITIZATION

Police and fire agencies must maintain close liaison with local agencies and private entities to prepare for civil unrest. These preparations include mutual aid agreements with other agencies,

plans for easy access to utilities (electricity, gas, and water companies), and contracts for the services of food preparers and distributors.

The following guidelines to combat civil unrest are listed in order of suggested priority.

1. Study all reports on previous civil unrest documented by each agency to identify any common predictors of events that can trigger violent reactions from residents,
2. Adopt a policy approach, through consultation with city administrators, the district attorney's office, and the mayor. This is crucial to avoid any legal ramifications that may complicate joint action by law enforcement and fire personnel.
3. Establish the extent of compatibility of the two agencies-careful documentation of a common language and the design of an agreeable command structure to ensure that personnel from both agencies can work together effectively. The agencies may have solid execution plans before coming together to formulate a joint plan or both agencies may start from ground zero to develop and establish a solid plan for joint action. The definition of professional terms is crucial at this point of preparing for civil unrest.
4. Present the final plan to the city administrators for administrative and financial considerations. At this juncture, questions as to who will finance the plan and where to procure the hardware should be answered.

COMMUNICATIONS

Technology has progressed faster than any other type of scientific advance in this century. Today, it is not unusual to hear about floating holograms, "head-up" displays that project images on nearby surfaces, computers integrated into the dashboards of vehicles, patrol cars carrying optical laser disks capable of storing millions of pages of information, voice-activated systems and video monitors that allow callers to see the person on the other end of the telephone.

The 911 operating system

In some states, the changeover to a 911 operating

system was mandated by legislation. However, some agencies have had to battle the telephone company for access to residential phone numbers and addresses. Others could not afford to maintain such a database and were happy to allow the telephone company to handle it. Some jurisdictions have had to decide whether a public service answering point (PSAP) would route calls or if the calls would be sent directly to the agency involved. Each telephone number in a 911 system has to be assigned to a particular law enforcement agency, fire department, or ambulance service. Funding has to be secured, hardware purchased, and consultants engaged, which could take from two to five years, and there are still many cities and counties that have not yet begun the process.

The 911 system is a simple concept, although implementing it can be difficult, expensive, and complicated. It consists of a telephone system hooked to a computer: when the phone rings, the computer checks its database to find the telephone number of the incoming caller and displays it on a monitor. The system is further enhanced when the computer gets smarter and automatically identifies and displays the telephone number, address, and, in some cases, the name of the person who owns that number. In some cases, accompanying information includes the fire department and ambulance service responsible for handling emergencies in the caller's area. If the jurisdiction uses a PSAP, the call taker simply pushes a button on the console to transfer the call to the appropriate police, fire, or ambulance dispatcher. The entire process takes less than fifteen seconds.

Before a changeover to the 911 system, administrators first must find an individual with both computer expertise and emergency service experience. They should observe systems already in operation in other jurisdictions in order to assess their own needs. Detailed and specific needs should be documented and a consultant retained to review the specifications, design the system, and help procure the desired hardware. Administrators should not attempt to become experts in all the different technologies involved. Several companies offer a variety of services associated with the implementation of a 911 system. GTE offers classes on 911 implementation and services and

products for creating a master street guide; computer-aided dispatch systems; and personnel who will conduct a site survey, determine how big the system should be, and work with the local telephone company and other vendors to implement the 911 system.

A highly tuned communications preparedness plan is invaluable to ensuring rapid and efficient response efforts. The Austin, Texas, Fire Department has averaged under five minutes citywide response time. The city is divided into five geographic regions or battalions, with a battalion chief in charge of all companies and alarms within the region. Operations companies are assigned a specific number of target sites within their district each year. Plans were developed for each district, using standard information forms in combination with site and floor plans. Copies were distributed to all affected companies, and a copy of each plan within a battalion chief's district was carried in that chief's vehicle. As the city grew, the files expanded from one or two binders to a specially designed field box which fit into the back of the battalion chief's car, a suburban-type vehicle. The file box could take up fully one-half of the space in the back of the car. Because of the size of the file box, the battalion chiefs carried only those plans relevant to their own district, which created problems when simultaneous incidents in a district required the response of an alternate battalion chief who might not have on-hand the plans associated with the second incident. With a total of 2,500 to 3,000 plans for the entire city (and more to come), it was impractical for each chief to carry all the plans for a particular district.

To resolve this problem, the department equipped its vehicles with cellular phones, purchased twelve portable fax machines, and updated communications procedures. The department was determined to find a more efficient way to store large amounts of data that could be recalled at a moment's notice to provide specific information for an incident commander. This information, in turn, had to be transmitted via fax machines linked to the cellular phones in the commanders' cars. To meet this challenge, operations personnel provided the latest site and floor plans. Other relevant site information was entered into the database specifi-

cally developed for this task. As now designed, the system has the potential to include photographs of buildings, hazardous areas, fire-alarm control panels and other objects, and could be invaluable as intelligence information to be shared among mutual aid partners during any crisis. The ultimate goal is efficiency-providing the greatest amount of information in the shortest amount of time to those who need it quickly.

Radios

In some departments, radio dispatch is still the best and most affordable system. Mobile and portable radios are not the behemoths of ten years ago. Crystals have been replaced by micro-processors, and where once an 8-channel system was considered sophisticated, today's equivalent may carry as many as 300 channels. Modern units are considerably smaller and more durable and feature numerous options, such as a message relay system and a scrambler that prevents eavesdropping and offers high-quality recovered audio. Other units offer such features as emergency access, priority queuing, and the ability to interface with other conventional channels, such as mutual aid frequencies.

Historically, emergency communication frequency assignments have been made so a fire department has its own unshared frequency for primary operations communications, if possible. A second frequency for administrative communications may be assigned. The same radio operating environment operates in police, public works, and utilities agencies. Each of the many departments in a jurisdiction has been assigned a radio channel for its almost exclusive use. Traditionally, radio channels have been assigned to government users based on the specific types of services they provide, such as fire, police, medical, or general local government. Orderly communications were the principal reason for this approach; also, it was important that public safety communications paths benefit from open communication lines whenever they were needed.

Decades ago, the telephone industry switched from its conventional wire-line system to a trunking system to meet the escalating demands for advanced technology and service. The same

technology today is applied to radio communication. The goal of a radio trunking system is to increase the percentage of time a radio channel is used for communications, by allowing that channel to broadcast any type of service communications rather than being dedicated to a single service. The trunking system does have some drawbacks. The major shortcoming is that all of the field fleets or base agencies sharing the system might transmit communications simultaneously, thus overloading the system.

Videotape systems

Videotape and photographic equipment used to film riot participants are helpful in assisting agencies to identify rioters for future reference, legal purposes, and historical documentation. Extreme caution should be used by individuals video-taping or photographing riot scenes, due to the probability of attack by the rioters.

Mobile data terminals

Mobile data terminals (MDTs), also known as mobile digital terminals or mobile computer terminals, extend to the officer in the field the capabilities available to the dispatcher. MDTs basically are dumb terminals (i.e., they can transmit and receive data but cannot process information in the same way as a personal computer). Accessing the state and national computers for warrants, checks, and intelligence information is executed via the terminal in the working vehicle, a process that bypasses the dispatcher and clears the air for other important transmissions. In some cases, personnel have access to calls which the CAD system holds in a pending file and can query the database for various types of information. The installation of MDTs assumes the department's computer system is capable of handling the extra workload. Traffic can increase substantially and the system should be designed to handle the additional load.

Laptop computers

Agencies should consider allowing their personnel to use laptop computers. These small, generally lightweight computers are usually less expensive than MDTs and can be used in place of or in

combination with them. Laptops allow officers in the field to complete incident reports and store the information or transmit it to the department's main computer via a modem hooked into telephone or radio lines. If the computer system is designed for it, personnel can access the main database as well as state and national computers in much the same way as those using MDTs.

Cellular phones

Cellular phones are another example of communications equipment that has grown in use and importance in the past several years. They allow the user to handle details that may not require their appearance at the scene. The disadvantage of cellular phones is their high cost and lack of confidentiality.

Logging equipment

Logging equipment is vital to communications units. Just as electronic technology has not replaced the traditional radio dispatch system, it is still necessary to record every call that comes into the department. There has been much progress in the development of high-tech equipment to address this need.

Hand-held computers

Although computers continue to shrink in size, they are still expected to perform bigger and more complex tasks. Hand-held computers epitomize sophisticated technology—small but powerful. This lightweight computer can be used to prepare short reports when an officer needs a paper copy, such as field interviews and abandoned vehicle or towing reports.

Regardless of the type of system procured, it is important to provide continuing support and maintenance of the units. While agencies spend thousands of dollars to upgrade systems, they hold back on expending money to recruit, train, and compensate those who operate and maintain them. Technology is indispensable in curtailing a dangerous riot situation, but personnel are still in control, and they should be adequately trained to use these new advances, both efficiently and knowledgeably.

Interacting with the media

Fire department and law enforcement spokespersons are responsible for conveying a professional image to the media and the public at all times. Each department should develop general guidelines to assist its personnel who meet with the public and the media. Common sense guidelines should improve encounters with the media and the public, while, at the same time, projecting a positive image for the agency.

“Fire department and law enforcement spokespersons are responsible for conveying a professional image at all times.”

PLANNING

Planning is basically a management function for preparing for civil unrest. The possibility of a civil disturbance is analyzed according to social indications and historical references. Resources are inventoried and appraised as to their effectiveness, and the manner in which the resources necessary to control the incident will be expended are determined. Plans should be available for review and critique by all agency personnel.

Agencies should establish a system that provides for the updating of civil unrest response plans as needed. Basic to an effective plan is a relationship between one department and other municipal departments or agencies. Agency personnel, particularly those involved directly in the planning process, should become acquainted with one another through social and professional interaction, such as attending roll calls and briefings on a weekly or monthly basis, depending on the organization. Interdepartment/interagency agreements should include a process for exchanging information that alters plans and, consequently, emergency strategies and operations.

Planning prior to a possible civil disturbance should reflect the prioritization procedures earlier. It involves identifying critical decisions that need to be made by fire and law enforcement agencies

and their mutual aid partners. Two types of planning should be addressed:

Strategic planning-the administrative and policy details which need to be agreed upon.

Tactical planning-planned responses to specific situations in the field.

Strategic planning. For fire and law enforcement agencies to work together, decisions have to be made based on available resources. These include equipment, staffing, transportation, food suppliers, facilities, and the support of local government, including the district attorney's office. It is at this point that a joint planning committee must decide whether existing resources are sufficient or whether they need to be supplemented for the purposes of working together. The joint planning committee should include agency chiefs, communications specialists, tactical experts, and at least one public information officer.

It is recommended that each agency provide its personnel with transportation. This is viewed as a flexible deployment approach for security reasons. Police should only escort fire vehicles if there is concrete evidence of life-threatening attacks on firefighters. If the designated impact area is secure, then it is best to have separate transportation for each agency's personnel. This recommendation is applicable also where mutual aid partners are involved. In general, security measures can be made based on historical and intelligence information.

Alternative base sites, such as those established during the Los Angeles riots, should be planned. These sites need to be easily accessible, provide shelter, and be staffed with maintenance, communications, feeding, and security personnel.

Both agencies need to plan how best to secure the impact zone as soon as it has been defined. The planning committee should decide also on a clear, common language and should detail how to set up joint/shared radio frequencies.

Tactical planning. The protests of the 1960s seem tame in comparison to recent civil unrest disturbances. Rather than peaceful demonstrations, police and fire departments today are faced with urban-guerrilla warfare tactics. The devastating aftermath

of the Los Angeles riot attests to the premise that riots have become more warlike. This was evident also after the McDuffie trial in Miami in 1980 and in a major disturbance in the Mount Pleasant neighborhood of Washington, D. C., in 1991.

Today, bands of protesters, rioters, looters, and arsonists are well organized and mobile. They move quickly through an area and have easy access to weapons, which they use freely and frequently (Pilant 1993).

Mobile field tactics present the biggest change for police in controlling a riot situation. Known also as the mobile field-force concept, it is essentially a change in the way law enforcement responds to civil disturbances. In general, the goal is to quickly and effectively disperse large crowds by removing them from the scene or separating them into small, manageable groups. These actions require a different response tactic on the part of law enforcement and fire officials than employed twenty to thirty years ago. Officers need special training in dealing with current “trends” in riots.

Mobile field tactics have changed law enforcement’s response to civil disturbances in numerous ways. In Los Angeles, for example, a skirmish line used to be made up of a squad of ten officers, with one sergeant in charge, and two officers acting as line backers, thereby reducing the number on the front line to seven. Generally, they were on foot, in the open, and had no other tactical support. If they came under fire, there was no place to take cover and no way to defend themselves other than with their sidearms. Today, the primary tactical component of the mobile force is still the squad, but its number may be as many as sixteen. Each vehicle carries four officers and the cars become a support tool for the officers. The vehicles are driven behind the line and can be used with lights and sirens to intimidate and/or direct crowds, recover injured officers or members of the public, and pursue suspects. They also serve as an effective public address system and as a blocking or maneuvering force,

Tactics employed by different jurisdictions vary. In Miami, for example, police draw a well-ordered line formation. They also apply a variety of mobile tactics to riot situations in urban areas. In Los Angeles, an advancing line of officers is

followed by several vehicles. In Miami, only one car follows a line—the rest are parked nearby, with an officer standing guard.

Firefighting tactics

In order to reach their objectives and lessen the danger to personnel, firefighters should use hit-and-run tactics. The goal is to knock down the fire and quickly exit the impact area. Selective fire damage plans should be adopted to ensure that units are first dispatched to the most critical areas. The use of large diameter hoses and heavy stream appliances should be maximized, and sprinkler systems should be required, particularly in buildings of over 5,000 square feet. The number of burnable items should be reduced as much as possible, for example, abandoned vehicles, trash, and debris. Abandoned buildings should be assessed for razing, since they are prime targets for covert activity and arson during riot situations.

“. . . to reach their objectives and lessen the danger to personnel, firefighters should use hit-and-run tactics.”

Fire departments should use engine companies in the impact area. Trucks or aerial ladders should be available in the area. All personnel with the potential of entering the impact area should always be protected with body armor. There should be no interior firefighting in impact areas, and a plan should be devised to control the spread of hazardous materials, such as pesticides, asbestos, and petroleum parts, into the sewage systems. Departments should ensure that there are enough bullet-proof vests to outfit all personnel who may potentially operate in the impact area. Suppliers should be identified (e.g., the military) in case there is an unforeseen need for more body armor and other protective gear.

It is useful to have “bird-dog” personnel on stand-by to direct and assist mutual aid response, as outside firefighting units and the National Guard may not have proper directions to designated impact areas.

INSTITUTING A MISSION STATEMENT

As police and firefighters plan to work together, both agencies need to establish a mission statement detailing staffing priorities. The Miami Police Department has established such a document, which serves as a basic guideline for joint operations between the agencies. The Department's guidelines in reference to Fire Department escorts are as follows:

Rationale

During a civil disturbance, Miami Fire Department units often come under attack from hostile elements, Fire units are an essential weapon in the suppressing of a civil disorder. The rescue element, of course, also provides important emergency medical services to the community and to the Police Department.

In order to accomplish this mission, the following procedures will go into effect upon a departmental mobilization.

Mobilization Priority

A total of eight two-person units will be assigned to fire stations. All fire stations will receive one two-man unit first... if extra resources are available, other stations will get the units in [a specified] priority order. The following are the mission assignments for police officers assigned to fire units:

(Prior to perimeters being closed)

1. The first priority will be the escort of Fire Rescue Units to calls within the affected area. Fire and police units responding to requests for medical services **will not** use emergency equipment when going into and out of the affected areas.
2. If there is a second two-person unit assigned to a fire station, this second unit will escort fire trucks to fire scenes, In this case, the Fire Department will respond in what they call a Task Force configuration. This is generally a task force commander's vehicle and three fire trucks. The police unit escorting should be immediately behind the task force commander's vehicle,
3. Under **no** circumstance will police escort vehicles leave their fire units unprotected. You are expected to remain with the rescue or task force **at all times**.

(When a perimeter is set)

In the event a perimeter is closed because of problems in an affected area, the following procedures will be in effect:

1. The two-person unit will continue to escort rescue or fire units. They will, however, receive clearance from the EOC or Fire Dispatcher before proceeding into the area.
2. If advised by the EOC or Fire Dispatcher, escort units will bring fire units to a specific intersection, where additional resources, such as field force element or SWAT may be assigned to assist.
3. A **no** lights or siren response will be the order of the day,
4. Once again, police units **will** remain with their fire personnel at all times,

Mutual sharing

Mutual sharing is a critical element of the planning process. In addition to the EMS, the resources commonly found within a municipal government complex include personnel from the building department (including engineers and architects), public works department (including heavy equipment operators), water department, electric and gas utility companies, and the telephone company, among others. Almost every skill a jurisdiction utilizes on a daily basis may be needed in an emergency. The fire service must identify these services and include them in their response plans.

Potential mutual aid partners

State and federal agencies have expertise and resources that can be called on in civil disturbances. These may differ from state to state. The obvious agencies include the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), and the local water commission. Other agencies may include the U.S. Coast Guard, the State Forest Service, the FBI, the Armed Forces, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of Transportation.

Neighboring fire and police departments can be particularly valuable partners. Large and small departments alike have limitations and no adjoining department should be excluded automatically.

All planning decisions—strategic and tactical—should be formalized, followed by an official memorandum of understanding between agencies. This document, along with the planning decisions, provides the basis from which to conduct relevant training of personnel.

TRAINING

Joint training exercises and simulations can be very helpful in educating and preparing fire and police personnel to work together effectively during civil unrest. By learning together, getting to know one another, and establishing a common *modus operandi*, valuable time will be saved when it becomes necessary to set up a joint ICS during a crisis. This is another lesson learned from the Los

Angeles riots. Although a special plan had been agreed upon in advance between the fire and police departments, it fell apart because the agencies did not work together. Fire chiefs were angry because of the lack of police escorts. Fire personnel could not reach fires because of threats to their lives and personal safety.

Active training is as important in civil disturbance situations as in all other facets of firefighting and law enforcement. It should involve all personnel in the department. Strategic goals must be communicated all the way down to line personnel. Joint training exercises should be conducted on a regular basis between fire and law enforcement personnel, and these exercises should be practiced regularly, until they become routine procedures. Political and media components, particularly Public Information Officers, should be included in all facets of training, including table-top exercises, simulations, and field exercises.

“Joint training exercises and simulations can be very helpful in educating and preparing fire and police personnel to work together effectively during civil unrest”

Both agencies should observe and understand each other’s SOPs. Firefighters and police officers need to be fully aware of their agency’s organizational principles—those that form the underpinnings of the department’s overall mission or philosophy. Officers must be apprised of the missions and goals of individual operations. One operation may call for mass arrests by police or firefighters putting out an arson fire, while another may put personnel from both agencies under fire and require armed back-up from police or the military.

The command staff should be well trained, with one incident commander in charge of overall guidance and direction of the operation. Command staff and their personnel should attend other agency roll calls on a regular basis and carry out regular joint training activities to become accustomed to each other and better learn each other’s SOPs.

Before actual training begins, administrators should conduct an exhaustive and detailed analysis of the organization and community. Is the organization set up to handle a major disturbance? How will it go about it? What is the feeling of the community relative to the handling of major disturbances? What resources can each department call upon when responding to critical incidents? Answering these questions should give command staff a better idea of the type of training needed and the type of equipment to be added to the department's arsenal.

Command staff need to know what type of training is available locally, in the county and the state, through universities and community colleges, private vendors, or other police and fire departments, and the military. Crucial areas to focus on include:

- **Risk analysis.** Teaching personnel how to look at what is happening in the community and evaluate that against the potential for problems.
- **Operational planning.** Understanding the principles of tactical operations and learning how to put an operational plan together.
- **Command structure.** Setting up a workable command structure and learning how to communicate the operation's mission, goals, and the tactical plans devised to accomplish them.
- **Tactics.** Adapting and using the mobile field-force and hit-and-run concepts, reviewing riot-control formations, the purpose and strategies for effective and appropriate use; understanding psychological factors and undergoing cultural sensitivity training; reviewing tactics for dispersing the crowd, rescuing victims or fallen personnel; infiltrating a crowd and removing its leaders; and utilizing ground and air support.

Other important areas to be covered include legal ramifications, methods of preventing and predicting civil disturbances, and strategies for improving relationships with the community.

Training should include every member of an agency. All personnel must be thoroughly apprised of the department's overall mission and the

mission of their partner agency.

EQUIPMENT

Equipment is a critical consideration, especially at times of civil unrest. Administrators should decide initially on the philosophy, purpose, and operational guidelines of the mobile force. These basic principles will help determine what type of equipment the department needs. Examples include:

Specialty vests. The standard issue vest is generally worn by most officers. Special weapons officers, those charged with tactical support and who expect to be in high-risk situations, may opt for a vest with a higher protection level than the standard issue. It should provide upper torso protection, enough freedom for arm movement, neck protection, and pockets for carrying special equipment.

“Specialty vests...should provide upper torso protection...freedom for arm movement... neck protection, and pockets for special equipment.”

Helmets. Helmets should cover the back of the neck (minimally) and the ears, block out noise, and, ideally, have enough room for a radio component or earpiece. For maximum efficiency, officers should be able to move the face shield up or out of the way and still get in and out of their patrol cars easily. Officers should be able to wear a gas mask with the helmet, which does not need to be ballistic unless the department expects officers to come under fire. Civil unrest police helmets are designed with a visor and a low center of gravity for stability.

Chemical agents. Chemical agents have a number of uses, including dispersing crowds, denying access, or giving an outnumbered force the advantage, as in the case of routing large groups of looters from stores. Smoke can be used to cover officers' movements, as well as to warn crowds that police will be using more serious weapons such as CS gas. While smoke is generally used as a warning or cover, it can also be used in

conjunction with CS gas to carry the chemical agent further into the crowd.

Although distraction devices such as the 37 mm foam rubber baton rounds, rubber pellet rounds, and bean bags fall in the category of chemical munitions, they may not be appropriate for use during a civil disturbance. Generally, noise-flash diversionary devices are used only by specially trained personnel in barricade situations.

Aircraft. Air support can be a vital component to both agencies and their mutual aid partners for crowd control. Rotary-wing aircraft can be used as spotters to provide intelligence information on violent and potentially dangerous situations. By giving ground commanders an instant snapshot of a wide area, motor-craft surveillance significantly enhances command and control functions. When properly equipped with sirens and a public address system, they can be used for diversion or distraction. They also can work in concert with a mobile field force for rapid deployment of rescue efforts and can provide platforms for video coverage of disturbances.

Specialty vehicles. The new Cobra, a riot-control vehicle, has been designed to disperse gatherings with a minimum of discomfort while providing maximum protection for the vehicle's occupants. Features include a water tank capable of propelling dye or pepper gas and a remote-controlled water turret with a 360 degree halogen lighting system.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The issue of who is the primary agency-in-charge during civil unrest is not to be determined on the emergency scene. However, even when resolved during the preparedness stage, command can be

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usurped in situations where there is not a strong command presence with effective incident com-

manders at work. An incident commander's presence must inspire people to perform on the emergency scene; it must set a standard for the management of the emergency.

During civil unrest, an incident commander must be prepared to face a multitude of technical, managerial, and political issues. Incidents that are effectively directed from technical and managerial perspectives can be perceived by the public and mutual aid partners as poorly managed because political issues associated with the incident are not adequately addressed.

ACCEPTING RISK

Incident commanders must be able to distinguish between assumptions and facts. They are responsible for the entire operation and welfare of everyone involved. If command is unsure or uncomfortable with any part of the plan or information received, further action should be delayed until incident command is satisfied. The incident commander should be a risk evaluator, not a risk taker. While the final decision will always rest with the incident commander, it should be based on input from the entire command staff.

Command officers must be cognizant of the legal implications of their decision making. This is an issue that should be addressed during the preparedness stage.

THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER

The Incident Command System is an effective vehicle for ensuring that commanders address the technical and political issues of civil disorder. A key officer in this regard is the public information liaison or Public Information Officer (PIO). This individual serves as the point of contact for all mutual aid representatives, allowing the incident commander and the command staff to focus on problem resolution while ensuring that political sensitivities continue to be addressed. The PIO's ability to effectively coordinate, handle, and "stroke" individual agencies and their representatives and the press will impact on how the incident is perceived from a political viewpoint.

Documentation speeds the reporting process. It is important to document everything during the

incident, particularly relevant details which may be lost in the confusion of the incident. Details such as times, locations, and names will aid in reconstructing what actually happened.

OPERATIONS ISSUES

An organizational philosophy and management goal of each agency's emergency response program for civil disturbance should be to develop operational procedures that will bring consistency to executing the response. The components of this system include:

- Developing SOPS
- Training all personnel in the scope, application, and implementation of SOPS
- Executing SOPS on the riot scene
- Reviewing and critiquing the effectiveness of operations
- Revising and updating SOPS during response and at the recovery stage

Over time, this standard management cycle ensures self-improvement.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Building a strong bond of understanding and cooperation should be an ongoing process between fire and police agencies and their jurisdictions. Community-oriented programs and constant feedback should be an integral part of the work of these agencies. Agency representatives, along with the PIO, should work to develop these programs and respond to the concerns expressed by members of the community.

The community outreach program adopted by the Philadelphia Fire Department in 1989 has contributed to the largest decrease in fatalities in Philadelphia in over thirty years. Activities like those listed below are always useful and have a high success rate in building a spirit of trust and cooperation between the community and fire and police agencies.

- Attend police community workshops to discuss pertinent fire safety issues
- Establish programs at Get-Set preschools, day care centers, and nursery schools
- Publish fire prevention articles in neigh-

borhood newspapers, written in English and Spanish by members of local companies

- Distribute fire prevention literature at area shopping centers on weekends
- Coordinate fire education programs with area hospitals so that blood pressure and cholesterol screenings can be conducted by local fire personnel
- Display fire prevention/safety messages on outdoor marquees or signs of businesses in the district
- Print fire prevention/safety messages on the pay stubs, advertisements, and shopping bags of participating local businesses
- Present programs at all houses of worship in the neighborhood
- "Adopt" elementary schools in respective local districts and participate in their programs-such as Career Day
- Become involved with local hospitals-pay a Christmas visit, for example
- Identify homes lacking smoke detectors, and purchase and install them in conjunction with the Fire Prevention Division
- Follow-up on a periodic basis to ensure that smoke detectors are operational. Replacement batteries could be made available through the fire prevention division and donated by battery manufacturers, community organizations, and businesses.

Public access media also are a valuable resource for developing community activities. Police and fire agencies could produce and/or sponsor informative programming on their "worlds"; or they could sponsor entertainment programming geared to both adults and children.

HOW AGENCIES CAN BUILD A RELATIONSHIP

It is imperative to build bonds of respect and trust between fire and police agencies, especially since they must work as one unit during crisis and unrest situations.

On the night of April 29, 1992, when the Los Angeles riots were escalating, the job of escorting firefighters was given to Metro, the police department's elite division that includes its SWAT teams

and other specialized units. Although this decision might be questionable, when protection ultimately was provided, firefighters praised the courage and dedication of their police escorts. Interagency communication was a major problem in this situation. Firefighters use different radio channels from those assigned to the police and there was no way to link them. The two agencies were unfamiliar with each other's equipment and methods of operation, and this proved to be a major handicap in the execution of their jobs during the emergency.

Each agency needs to fully understand how the other sees the world. They need to build relationships for the welfare of the community. Atlanta fire and police chiefs, for example, meet for dinner once a week. They share their experiences, compare notes, and get to know and understand

each other. The weekly dinners have helped to build and strengthen the strong cooperation and trust that exists between police and fire personnel in the city.

Another successful program first developed by the Miami Police Department in 1981 is the SWAT media program. Under this program, firefighters trained as paramedics attend the Miami Police Department SWAT school. After completing this program, the firefighters are fully trained in the defensive use of firearms and SWAT tactics. This training qualifies them to move into hostile areas to render urgent life-saving aid. The program is very effective during a civil disorder, where police and/or fire personnel can be injured. It has positive benefits for both agencies and builds stronger, firmer ties between the two.

5

RESPONSE



W. A. Bridged/*Atlanta Journal Constitution*

5

RESPONSE

Implementing a response plan for civil unrest must be viewed with caution so as not to provoke or increase riots. Department heads or the Incident Commander (IC) must keep in mind that deploying resources in the form of strike teams or task forces in a nonviolent area may increase tension. On the other hand, responding with inadequate resources may endanger emergency response personnel.

During the second trial of the Los Angeles police officers in the summer of 1993 and the ensuing high tension in major cities across the nation, many cities evaluated their state of preparedness for civil unrest. City plans were put in place for the possibility of riots, and many city governments were prepared for a “worst case scenario.” Although the violence never erupted, emergency services were faced with the question of “How do we respond in high-tension areas without inciting violence?”

A department standard response to a call in a riot zone may be two engines, police units, a Battalion Chief and a medic unit. This may be in response to a car fire or other types of small fires. This show of strength may be seen as a demonstration of force or a risk escalating the violence.

In some cases, while tension is building, the fire department may elect to treat calls in a potentially hot zone with a standard response call (one engine to a small dumpster fire). On the other hand, in an area which has experienced violent attacks, the department may increase the standard response to ensure protection for emergency response personnel. Incident Commanders must rely on intelligence from the field to match the proper response to the situation in the riot zone. They must address the safety needs of the emergency response personnel and the protection of the community.

PRIORITIZATION

The effective execution of activities in response to civil disorder impinges heavily on thorough preparation strategies such as those mentioned above. In most cases, preparedness and response go hand-in-hand. The ideal scenario is one in which policies adopted in the joint fire/police preparedness stage anticipate all contingencies and are implemented so well that policy decisions do not have to be made during the response period. However, no matter how carefully plans are made, one can never develop specific policies to deal with all of

the variations in the types of incidents that may trigger civil unrest. One can never anticipate all the things that can go wrong or foresee all the demands placed on fire and police organizations and the community during the response period.

Effective response tactics may include the following:

1. Unified command must be implemented immediately before and after declaring a civil disturbance. This is essential in order to effectively avoid chaos and to coordinate tactical activities.
2. Frequent briefings and planning meetings have to take place between police and fire executives during the civil unrest. Fire and police executives and field commanders have to be informed constantly of the progress of tactical strategies and the status of firefighters and police officers in the field. Situations will change quickly and may take a turn for the better or worse, depending on the environment and the mood of civilians. Strategies must be changed and implemented on short notice.

“Unified command... is essential... to avoid chaos and coordinate tactical activities.”

3. Communications management is crucial in the midst of tactical response activities. Dissemination of the wrong information by the media or by the PIO could incite destructive activity by troublemakers and make the emergency situation practically uncontrollable. The media may either provide timely warnings or create mass panic.
4. Mutual aid agreements must be activated and all organizations must be alerted to respond on short notice to the needs of fire and police task forces. The IC may request the services of EMS personnel, politicians, federal sources, public works departments, community leaders, and hospitals.

The joint IC must maintain control through

clearcut role definitions and lines of authority in order to quickly curtail and subdue the disturbance.

COMMUNICATION

A strong communication network is crucial to quickly end civil disturbances.

- General communication and SOPS should come from the IC to ensure rapid and accurate flow and avoid duplication.
- The IC team should be well equipped to handle a possible inundation of phone calls, such as occurred during the Los Angeles riots, where numerous personnel were committed to coordinating and controlling and channeling distress calls, recalls of reserve personnel, and to process calls for help and direction from fire, EMS, and police officers.
- PIOs of fire and police departments must be well informed and ready to coordinate the dissemination of information. Effective communication involves providing and sharing intelligence and progress information with other organizations, including political entities, the mayor’s office, community leaders, federal resources such as the National Guard, and the media.
- Early-incident decision making by officers in the field should be encouraged. Task force members should be directed to strike as necessary, with or without communication with the IC.
- A PIO or liaison officer should be on duty at all times during the emergency.

Communications equipment

Computerized communications systems should be maintained and monitored to ensure that they are in proper working order and in adequate supply.

To be effective in the joint command center, communications equipment should be in integrated mode. One method of integrating radio frequencies is to trunk all mutual aid frequencies. An alternative to voice radio is the Mobile Data Terminal (MDT). The San Diego Police Department successfully employed their network of MDTs to

transmit tactical information to field units and to effectively deploy their forces to quell disturbances which were sparked by the Rodney King verdicts. All vehicle dispatches and tactical information were relayed via the MDT system-voice communication was not used except in emergencies. Other equipment, e.g., telephone lines and broadcast equipment, should be compatible, and a common language should be used by the task force.

PLANNING

Planning must be an ongoing function throughout the response period. Activities should include:

- Constant evaluation and exchange of intelligence by joint command personnel, who are focused on quelling the disturbance and avoiding riots, looting, violence, and arson-related activities, are important.
- Resource needs may change throughout the civil unrest, and command personnel must be prepared to adjust their directives to address these needs in the impact zones.
- Operational guidelines may need to be modified by command personnel in order to implement strategies if there are unexpected eruptions of violence and excessive demands on resources, such as transportation.
- New mutual aid agreements may have to be reached to address unforeseen circumstances, such as terrorist activity. The civil unrest in Los Angeles required the rapid mobilization of resources from the entire State of California. Fire agencies within California had a well-defined system due to the extensive use of the mutual aid system to combat wildfires in the state. The use of mutual aid strike teams greatly contributed to the ability to confine and extinguish fires and save many lives.
- Joint tactical initiatives have to be re-coordinated, as necessary. Personnel may have to undergo quick training to combat unforeseen challenges.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The incident commander must continuously consult with staff and other involved agencies and

build tactical action plans, distribute such plans, and document all information.

- Command personnel must quickly identify impact zones, secure dangerous areas, and control movement on public thoroughfares. Guidelines must be direct and decisive on how resources must enter and operate in a specific impact zone.
- Resource management is a crucial command and control function. The joint command personnel must authorize and supervise the dispensation of resources, such as body armor, food supplies for field personnel, transportation, firearms, tools and other equipment, medical supplies, and the effective rotation and protection of personnel.

“Resource management is a crucial command and control function”

- The experience and high visibility of command personnel, both individually and as a team, are important to effective decision making. Good, effective commanders will be personally involved with their staff and field commanders and will personally communicate with other commanders, community leaders, and elected officials. They should make personal appearances at news conferences and keep informed on the latest intelligence. They should be technically proficient and aggressive in obtaining and disseminating information.

OPERATIONS ISSUES

Declaration of a state of emergency is usually a prudent strategic move during civil unrest. Key operations issues include:

- Restricting the use or delivery of emergency services to civilians. For example, residents will continue to expect emergency services during disturbances, and plans should be made to deal with the high number of calls. If possible, the 911 line should be restricted for distress needs only during the disturbance and degraded criterion for resources should be implemented.

- Curtailing all nonessential services in the impact areas.
- Determining critical needs and warranted actions for effective response. Immediate responses suggested under an emergency plan include:
 - Closing all gas stations in the community and in the immediate surrounding areas
 - Closing ammunition and firearms shops
 - Closing all liquor stores in the community and in the immediate surrounding areas
- Declaring a state of emergency to curtail public access to impact areas, a strategy proven effective under operations. It is important to contain violent and destructive activity.

This action proved successful in the Washington, D.C., Mount Pleasant disturbance, in May 1991. The Mount Pleasant area is one of the most diverse international communities in the District of Columbia. Many immigrants in the community live in small apartments, under extremely crowded conditions. Most of them work a six-day week and Sunday is generally their only day for R & R. In this instance, a Salvadoran national was shot by a police officer after resisting arrest for drunkenness. This sparked a civil disturbance. Although no one was killed, the rioters were particularly violent and many seemed to be versed in guerilla tactics—a dangerous situation for residents and other civilians in the area. Deputy Chief Melvin High of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department identified the imposition of a dusk-to-dawn curfew as the key to bringing this riot situation under control.

- Modifying SOPs according to the intensity of the disturbance. Firefighters in Los Angeles had to adhere to the following emergency SOPs:
 - No firefighters working on roofs
 - No laddering of buildings
 - No ladder truck companies in impact zones
 - No overhauling of fires
 - No interior fire attacks

In addition to escorting fire companies dis-

patched to an impact zone, police officers may have to deploy resources relative to the escalation of force, including the utilization of special weapons and chemical agents,

“Modify SOPs according to the intensity of the disturbance.”

- Mobilizing resources quickly is crucial to an effective response to civil unrest. The community’s mutual aid system should be immediately rendered operative. All neighboring fire and police departments should be alerted and briefed on the status of the disturbance. They should also be ready to share whatever intelligence they have that may be relevant to the disturbance.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Keeping the community abreast of what its agencies are doing in response to civil unrest is the key to executing an effective response strategy. Agencies need the community’s cooperation in order to make their strategies effective. Frequent communication through public liaison officers and the media are necessary in order to reassure the citizens that their interests and concerns are being addressed by police and fire agencies and other public officials.

- Residents in the community are an invaluable resource for controlling disturbances. Community leaders should be used as part of the police intelligence network.
- The community should be kept informed, as much as possible, through regular press releases and updates without endangering the effectiveness of field operations.
- A calm yet commanding presence, and firm, forceful activity by police and fire agencies will generally serve to quell the fears of community residents. This approach will encourage people’s cooperation in adhering to curfews and in sharing valuable intelligence. The confident, joint presence of police and firefighters will reassure the community that, with their support, a dangerous situation can be controlled.

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
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6

RECOVERY



6

RECOVERY

To address post-incident needs, the initial priorities should be to restore stability and provide aid to those injured and suffering loss from the riot.

Firefighting and police agencies should reacquaint themselves with the community through programs that fit the make-up and the special needs of their specific jurisdictions. The agencies should then re-equip their departments with systems and equipment to deal with future civil unrest.

TRAINING

Civil unrest requires police and fire departments to adopt a military model, which creates, in itself, stresses within the organization and in relations with other agencies. Individual officers often are faced with conflict between their normal autonomous roles and the requirement to strictly follow unit directives during riots.

Addressing stress-the Los Angeles experience

Research studies indicate that standard psychological and physical responses to stressful events are harmful to the body under certain conditions. Prolonged exposure to stress frequently produces

psychological and physical damage. In response to this concern, the LAFD's Stress Management Program provides several services to its employees to combat this problem:

- A five-year extensive on-site training within the department to educate members to recognize stress symptoms and reduce stress
- Critical incident debriefings by licensed psychologists experienced in the psychological effects of critical incidents on public safety personnel
- Short-term counseling and a Peer Support Program (PSP)

Critical incidents such as civil unrest occur when public safety personnel are faced by emergency reactions, which can interfere with their ability to function either at or away from the scene. Supervisory fire personnel in the LAFD are trained to recognize symptoms associated with prolonged stress. The department's Critical Incident and Stress Debriefing (CISD) Team provides timely consultation after a critical incident to reduce the impact of stress on department members. The Los Angeles CISD Team includes

department personnel who have received specialized training in stress identification and management, crisis intervention, listening and related skills. Some team members are also trained mental health professionals. PSP members are volunteers from all ranks within the department, both sworn and civilian, who are trained in listening and assessment skills, problem solving, crisis identification, substance abuse referrals, and other related skills. They work with employees and their families during crisis situations. The benefits of this program are generated by less frequent use of sick leave, workers' compensation, stress-related pensions, and employee turnover caused by job "burnout." Recent statistics reveal that for each \$1 spent in stress management programs, over \$2.50 is saved in absenteeism and workers' compensation claims.

The videotape as a training tool

In response to a spate of litigation over the use of deadly force, an increasing number of state and local police agencies are buying the Firearm Training System (FATS), a device that uses a life-size television screen and a laser-equipped weapon to help officers learn when to fire and who, if anyone, should be fired upon. FATS includes a rifle or handgun fitted with a laser that can fire a beam at realistic movie scenarios, such as looters photographed from the officer's point of view. The machine grades judgment, accuracy, and reaction speed. "FATS is the most up-to-date training method," says Gary Krantz, training manager with the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Many federal agencies already have it, he notes, and "those state and local agencies blessed with foresight and good budgets are beginning to implement it as well" (Persinos, 1989).

The system has proven its worth in court cases. FATS creates a detailed record of each officer's performance, thus it can be used in the defense of a department that has been sued because of a shooting incident. It is a preventive, legal measure as well as a training system.

Recently, the Jacksonville, Florida, sheriff's department used the evidence provided by FATS training to convince the court that an officer had

been well trained and had acted reasonably when he shot and killed a suspect who appeared to be armed.

Videotape can also be a cost-efficient training tool. The nine members of the Belding, Michigan, Police Department produce their own training and public relations tapes. When officers return from a training seminar, they share their new knowledge with their fellow officers, using the department's videotaping facilities. Spearheading production of a training tape has three benefits:

1. It reinforces what the officer learned
2. It provides for low cost training of others
3. It boosts morale and self-confidence

The Belding Police Department also purchased videotape training modules, which limits the need to send their officers to training academies. The video programs enable the department to train its officers for only \$500. Tapes are viewed while the officers are on-duty or during roll call, thus eliminating overtime and lodging costs of off-site training (International City Management Association 1987).

The Human Rights Resource Center Program

One of the more innovative approaches to training is that of the Human Rights Resource Center in San Rafael, California. This is a community awareness training program that helps police officers better deal with diverse groups and avoid cultural misunderstandings. The Human Rights Resource Center's program provides information about cultural and ethnic diversity that police and fire agencies need in order to avoid cultural misunderstandings. The program develops communication and conflict resolution skills for officers that can help them avoid unnecessary conflict with citizens and complaints about their actions. The program also provides effective policies and techniques to foster positive community relations and enhance communication skills and safety in working with diverse groups within the community.

Upon completion, the Community Awareness Training Program will allow personnel to:

- Communicate effectively with diverse groups
- Promote and strengthen ties with the community

- Utilize appropriate intervention skills
- Minimize the escalation of violence due to cultural differences
- Enhance team-building skills with other officers

This training is designed to address the specific needs of police departments. Under the program, the Human Rights Resource staff will:

- Meet with the department chief
- Work with a department liaison to assist with coordinating the training
- Meet with line staff to develop and receive input on training
- Meet with representatives of community-based organizations to receive input and materials from the constituencies they represent
- Develop a community assessment questionnaire and interview citizens from the communities represented
- Select a training site conducive to training
- Develop critical scenario scripts and select local actors from diverse groups with the assistance of department and community representatives
- Select panel members who are representatives of diverse groups in the community
- Review the program content and course materials with the chief and/or liaison and agree on delivery schedule

Training for fire and law enforcement personnel should address the importance of understanding and developing the skills necessary for them to converse with the public in on-the-street contacts. Words or phrases expressed inappropriately or in an offensive tone can frequently result in negative consequences. Personnel need to understand how to express themselves without generating antagonism or hostility.

The above are all innovative forms of training which may be considered by fire and law enforcement agencies during the recovery period after a detailed review and analysis of a civil disturbance.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

The concerns and needs of the community after a

riot situation must be addressed immediately so as to mitigate similar situations in the future, Fire and law enforcement personnel must build a bridge of mutual understanding and respect between themselves and their community.

A study on policing with community cooperation

Those who know Dave Dobrotka, deputy chief of the Minneapolis Police Department, could not have been too surprised in May 1992 when he rankled many of his fellow officers by enlisting black activists and gang leaders to help quell a disturbance on the city's north side. The stereotypical police officer is conservative, decisive, and disciplined to the point of rigidity. Dobrotka is none of the above. That was obvious a quarter-century ago when, as Dobrotka, now 44, admits, "I still haven't decided what I want to do when I grow up."

But in the wake of the Los Angeles riots, with ongoing tensions between police officers and predominantly poor and young urban residents, Dobrotka has a clear sense of what he wants to do. "I am a police officer but I am also a peace officer," he says. "I believe I have as much of an obligation to be an instrument to enforce the law."

Dobrotka was able to be both on the night of May 7. He and Minneapolis Police Chief John Laux and a dozen other officers were with 102 junior high students at a camp retreat in New Brighton when word came that there had been a shooting in north Minneapolis. An anonymous flyer claiming incorrectly that a black youth had been shot by a police officer brought an angry crowd of about 800 people to the street. At one point, a KMSP-TV news crew was attacked and beaten. On the way in, Dobrotka heard the sergeant-in-charge withdraw police from the scene after concluding that they were escalating tensions. He stopped by the offices of The City, Inc., a predominantly black community organization often critical of the police, to request assistance. A group of about fifteen black leaders joined police at the scene, and the incident ended without further injury. Dobrotka effusively praised Spike Moss, City Inc.'s director of at-risk-youth services, and other community members.

The trust between Dobrotka and community activists has evolved slowly and often painfully. “For the first eighteen years of my career, I had heard about the Spike Mosses and the Clyde Bellecourts, who were never portrayed in a positive light by my colleagues,” Dobrotka says. “When I got the opportunity to meet with them in a one-on-one situation, I saw in just about every one of them, a totally different side. After we are through shouting at each other, there has always been a willingness to come back and discuss the problems.”

“People are realizing that the city can’t operate without an effective police department, and police officers are recognizing that 826 cops can’t police 366,000 citizens without a fair number of them wanting us to,” Dobrotka says, in defense of community policing.

At the same time, Dobrotka knows that many people, inside and outside the department, resent his chumminess with past critics of the police. “I believe there are a certain few in the department who believe in what happened (in May) wholeheartedly and support what we did,” he says. “There are a few who think it was the absolute wrong message to send and a bad thing to do. But my gut feeling tells me that a majority of the department is sitting back and waiting to see what happens next. They are thinking, ‘It worked one time, but we still have several summer months to go’” (Robson 1992).

Responding to a diverse community-the communications gap

The city of Aurora, Colorado, is a suburb east of Denver. It covers more than 150 square miles with a population of 250,000. The end of the Vietnam War brought a significant influx of Asians, and Aurora had its first major increase in limited-English-speaking residents since the mid- 1950s. Aurora became a veritable melting pot of Korean, Vietnamese, and Hispanic immigrants, all seeking the American dream of freedom, citizenship, and ownership. The initial reaction of many community members was that the Asian people would have to “fit into society” by learning to speak English and that community locals should not try to communicate in the languages of these immigrants.

The emergency response community began to receive calls for help from members of the Asian communities, who would dial 911 and try to relate a problem, using a nearby translator or their own

“Ethnic tradition often play(s)... a role in the communications gap.”

limited English skills. The communications gap delayed the fire department’s ability to dispatch emergency services, causing further complications. Some of the new immigrants were from countries where the government and military-controlled police wielded fear and manipulation as weapons. As a result, there was an understandable distrust of anyone wearing a uniform—firefighters included.

Ethnic tradition often played a role in the communications gap. Many times the Asian tradition of “coin rubbing” to fight off illness was mistaken by police and firefighters as a sign of child abuse. Another example was the kneeling position required by police to safely “pat down” a suspect. For Asians, this brought back memories of their people being executed in a kneeling position.

As these situations grew in frequency, the police and fire departments decided to meet with leaders from the various Asian and other ethnic communities to address these problems. This led to the formation of classes focusing on ethnic and cultural traditions, a first step toward understanding cultural differences and gaining the initial trust and respect of the Asian communities. However, this trust did not completely eradicate the communication barrier between Asians and emergency service personnel.

Understanding the ethnic traditions of groups in a community can prevent misinterpretation of vital communication which may be key to saving a life. Consider the following scenario:

The fire department has been designated to coordinate a task force on a new radio system. When the group meets, one member, a Vietnamese programmer, remains silent. Later, other members conversing at lunch suggest that the programmer is not interested and not part of the team. This is not necessarily true. Many Asians

prefer not to express opinions unless they are thoroughly knowledgeable with the subject. Some will express opinions only on direct invitation to do so. In general, Asians focus more on listening and observing and less on expressing opinions.

This may be related to what is perceived as a lack of crisis humor in Asians. Americans tend to joke in the face of a crisis or stressful situation. Many Asians 'interpret this behavior as a lack of appreciation of the problem.

The potential for misunderstanding exists on a simpler level. The Aurora Fire Department recognized the potential for disaster if an incident were to occur at a multi-unit apartment largely occupied by Asians. The fire department began a community outreach campaign directed at the ethnic communities.

Bilingual volunteers who spoke English and an Asian language served as translators for emergency services. Although this worked well in normal situations, problems remained when immediate medical attention or information relating to a crime was required. To resolve this, a book of basic questions (answerable with a nod or pointing) in five different languages was compiled. Questions asked by the fire department included:

- Do you know where the fire started?
- Can you point to where the fire started?
- Did someone start the fire?
- Which of these things was involved in the fire?
- Can you point to where the suspect ran?
- Can you point out in this book the colors of the clothing the suspect was wearing?

This book proved invaluable as an immediate measure for emergency services personnel and has helped frustrated, limited-English-speaking citizens provide information in emergency situations.

Another element of the project was to recruit persons interested in becoming translators and to train them in basic police and fire procedures. The community response was remarkable-volunteer translators were willing to be on call twenty-four hours a day. They attended training sessions to assist their countrymen to become members of the community. The network of volunteers was officially recognized in 1990 by a city council resolu-

tion as the International Cross Cultural Network of America (ICCNA). The ICCNA now has more than sixty volunteers who speak more than twenty-six languages. It has branched out to provide translators and interpreters for emergency and nonemergency situations, speakers on cultural issues for educational purposes, and promotion of the city's related functions and projects.

Cross-cultural communication has become a buzzword. In Aurora, a bridge of mutual understanding and respect was created through the willingness of community-oriented employees (LaRusso 1993).

The above illustrations are but a few examples of successful community outreach programs adopted by law enforcement and fire agencies across the country.

The importance of mutual aid teams

During the 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest, police and firefighters made extensive use of their mutual aid system. For the duration of the disturbance, 180 different fire agencies from throughout the state of California participated. These agencies mobilized eighty-five strike teams, which represented approximately 2,000 firefighters from the six regions in California. Mutual aid was very well developed, defined, and easy to mobilize, due to the extensive use of the system to combat wildland fires in the state.

"The use of mutual aid strike teams greatly contributed to the confinement and extinguishment of fires."

The Los Angeles City Fire Department received help from seventeen strike teams from Region 1 and one strike team from Area A. A total of forty-eight different agencies contributed to the creation of the strike teams that entered the Los Angeles city limits.

The use of mutual aid strike teams greatly contributed to the confinement and extinguishment of fires. Without their assistance, the loss of property would have been significantly higher. The

mutual aid system functioned as planned, and this single incident of civil unrest validated the need for its existence. The fact that the mutual aid system was frequently implemented to combat wildland fires and that mutual aid resources used a common ICE terminology contributed to their effectiveness. Mutual aid strike teams were able to work well together within the established ICE organization.


State agencies working together

One example of state agencies working together successfully under a mutual aid agreement is the Commonwealth of Virginia's Offensive Mobilization Against Narcotic Distribution (COMAND).

Created by executive order, COMAND includes the Department of State Police, the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, the Department of Game and Inland Fisheries, the Department of Forestry, the Department of Aviation, the Virginia Marine Resources Commission, and the Virginia Port Authority. This consortium provides additional and much needed manpower to the state police in its efforts to fight Virginia's drug problem. At a time when the state workforce is being reduced, additional manpower is allotted to the interdiction of illegal drugs and associated crimes with no added expense to the taxpayer. The program also allows state agencies whose primary missions are not drug enforcement (such as fire agencies) to make a contribution to reduce a major problem facing the citizens they serve.

7

SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONS



7

SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONS

Researchers now believe that riots develop in three distinct phases. Phase One occurs when an incendiary incident or action sets off a disturbance among a small group within a well-confined area of a city. In Phase Two, ordinary citizens, alerted by media coverage but often not overly concerned with the precipitating problem, join the crowd for the purpose of looting, and the disturbance begins to spread to other sections of the city. Phase Three is set off when organized youth gangs join in the riot with planned activities directed against targets of opportunity, such as gun stores. This report has attempted to outline possible steps which can be taken by fire/EMS personnel and police to prepare for, respond to, and recover from this build-up of events.

The solutions for successful joint operations between fire/EMS and police agencies have been detailed under the categories of Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. Under each category, the issues of Prioritization, Communication, Planning, Training, Command and Control, Operations, and Community Relations have been addressed and are summarized below.

MITIGATION

The following are mitigation efforts which are applicable to a civil unrest incident. When a disturbance is imminent, fire personnel must:

- Pick up refuse/trash/debris
- Reduce the amount of “burnable” items
- Prioritize and clear vacant buildings
- Remove abandoned automobiles
- Educate the public, including owners of high-risk occupancies, about the situation
- Install metal roll-up doors and windows on buildings
- Institute community participation, for example:
 - neighborhood activities
 - safe-place programs at the firehouse or police station
 - establish youth leagues to work on community improvement projects
 - hold public education forums
 - improve the racial balance of firefighters and police officers
 - recruit workers from the inner city

- establish effective cultural diversity training programs
- identify and work with the real power sources in the community

Many hours should be invested in meeting with neighborhood groups. ”

Agencies should know their community and should encourage organized social interactions with the community at large. A strong sense of community and cooperation is key to preventing a dangerous civil unrest situation.

Many hours should be invested in meeting with neighborhood groups. These groups are usually able to identify a simmering problem long before authorities can, and later they may provide help to cool down the situation before it erupts.

PREPAREDNESS

Fire and police agencies should carry out extensive planning and training to encompass all entities concerned with the public good. These include administrative and government agencies; political interests, including the mayor, the governor, local

“A well-defined incident command system should be planned and established...”

politicians, and other public servants; support services, such as water and sewage agencies, electrical power companies, public works departments, transit authorities, hospitals, communication agencies, media agencies, and community organizations; and federal agencies such as the National Guard. A comprehensive “battle plan” starts with formal agreements among these agencies. Special riot training is imperative to deal effectively with today’s riot situations. Most officers today average about seven years on the police force and are unlikely to have experienced the riots that engulfed many cities in the 1960s. Ex-

tensive updating is needed for joint training in all aspects of riot control. This includes training in the possible causes of riots, the use of equipment most efficient in riot control, and how to work with mutual aid agencies, both locally and from other jurisdictions.

Public information officers and staff should be an integral part of the operations of police and fire agencies. They should be exposed to the training received by all other personnel so they can become familiar with all aspects of riot control and, as such, be able to communicate the agency’s activities to the media and the community.

A well-defined incident command system should be planned and established at a mutually agreed upon headquarters to monitor and manage incidents during riots.

RESPONSE

Successful riot control depends on a quick and decisive show of force, built on a foundation of careful and thorough preparation. Successful response depends on a quick and decisive show of force and authority. This can only be effective by

“Successful riot control depends on a quick and decisive show of force, built on a foundation of careful and thorough preparation.”

putting into operation a sophisticated ICS-well-equipped, efficiently staffed, and appropriately trained professionals-with clearly defined job tasks. This includes the important task of historian to accurately document events for future reference.

Once things are out of control on the streets, it is essential that authorities be able to operate from a fully equipped command post that must serve as their eyes and ears. This includes televisions, radios, telephones, computers, fax machines, and detailed maps.

In a fast-moving riot situation, field commanders closest to the action should have the authority to make decisions about resource deployments. However, they should not have control

over strategic decision making, such as the deployment of additional resources, as they do not have the big picture view. Carefully planned and executed lines of command and control between the field and the EOC eliminate the need for a bureaucratic chain of command. What is needed during these crucial times is a highly disciplined, organized machinery to execute rapid response and containment.

Officers can contain activity effectively through curfew, the closing of liquor stores, gun stores, gas stations, and sporting goods stores. By establishing checkpoints, negative outside forces may be discouraged from aggravating the situation.

RECOVERY

When it is all over, healing (by rebuilding relationships in the community) and cleaning up

“Fire and police personnel should meet...”

should be the first priority. This process will have an important psychological effect, limiting the chances of renewed flare-ups.

Fire and police personnel should meet to discuss their activities and identify areas for improvement. They should share their findings with the community and encourage feedback.

APPENDIX 1
THE ROLE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES
IN CIVIL UNREST



APPENDIX 1

THE ROLE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES IN CIVIL UNREST

Initial riot control responsibility in the U.S. falls on local civil law enforcement and is based on the necessary minimum force concept. The primary backup to civil police forces is the National Guard, trained and equipped by the U.S. Army and under command of the state governor. If extra reinforcements are needed, the guard is federalized and placed under command of the regular Armed Forces. This is what happened in Los Angeles in April and May 1992.

The regular army has historically been reluctant to being called in at the onset of major rioting. It prefers that the more politically palatable citizen-soldiers of the National Guard be used, initially, in any major civil unrest operation.

In 1932, in the midst of the Great Depression, a national movement, largely made up of a ragtag army of 22,000 jobless and desperate World War I veterans, formed what the press called the "Bonus Army." They encamped in Washington, D. C., where unsuccessful pleas were made to Congress for prepayment of a veterans' bonus scheduled for 1945. Government demands that the "Bonus" marchers disperse were resisted. Fearing incipient revolution, President Hoover ordered Army Chief

of Staff Douglas MacArthur to clear the capital. This was done using cavalry, tanks, and infantry. There were numerous casualties and one child was killed by tear gas. Consequently, the army received adverse publicity and there were political repercussions in Congress, on which the military was dependent for future appropriations. This incident has been a continuing, contributing factor to the low priority given military riot-control training, guidelines, research, and funding for nonlethal weapons procurement. In turn, the National Guard's ability to more effectively back-up civil law enforcement in major domestic disturbances is directly affected. Recent incidents (i.e., the Los Angeles riots) point to the need for a domestic force that is properly trained and equipped.

THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS

The National Guard battalion in Inglewood was mobilized to help quell the Los Angeles riots. The battalion tactical operations center, which included the S2 section, was operational within thirty minutes of the mobilization order. Officers immediate-

ly began to gather information, using radio and television reports. Early in the riots, telephone lines were often unavailable because of the heavy volume of calls throughout the area. Even cellular and pager circuits, later a primary means of communication, were too congested for use. FM communication was almost useless in this urban environment. Finally, an armed liaison party was sent to the Inglewood police headquarters to get what local information was available. During the early stages, it was impossible to prepare a modified combined obstacles overlay because **all** of Los Angeles was a “go” area for gangs and rioters. Because of the nature of the operations and the tactical situation, it was not possible to prepare event templates, doctrinal templates, or decision support templates, nor a synchronization matrix. However, a situation overlay and collection plan were completed.

The situation overlay allowed the battalion to plot the location of hundreds of fires, lootings, and shootings as they occurred. As the operation developed and more information came in, the overlay showed curfew areas, appropriate police jurisdictional boundaries, and roads and freeways closed or declared danger areas. The battalion focused on company areas of operations and shooting incidents, especially those involving the guard.

Patterns of activity

It was difficult to predict the next trouble spot. However, as patterns of activity developed, the S2 section combined information about the locations of the most dangerous gangs with estimates of current primary targets of opportunity-including 7-Eleven convenience stores and auto supply, electronics, sporting goods, and shoe stores. This assessment aided field commanders in deploying assets to likely “hot spots” in the areas of operations as missions were assigned.

The battalion was on target in placing local assets at critical gang targets. The Lynwood Police Department’s watch commander expressed gratitude to the battalion for its help.

Suggestions for changes in operations

How could tactical intelligence at a battalion level be more effective? Lt. Col. William V. Wenger

(Commander, 3d Battalion, 160th Infantry Division, California Army National Guard) and 1st Lt. Fredric W. Young (3d Battalion S2) suggest the following improvements (Wenger and Young 1992):

Order of battle. If possible, operational and intelligence staffs of the respective military and law enforcement units should anticipate use of military force early and maintain frequent liaison. They should develop workbooks documenting local gang characteristics-organization and structure, territories, tactics, and weapons by type and frequency used.

High value targets. Integrate multiple intelligence sources to identify a systematic documentation for anticipated operations or trouble spots. High value targets may include:

- Potential targets, such as the Foothill Division Police Station where Rodney King was arrested, or the Korean-owned Empire Liquor Market Deli where fifteen-year-old Latasha Harlins was fatally shot.
- High visibility targets, including such areas as the Martin Luther King/Drew Medical Center and the Kenneth Hahn Shopping Center, which the National Guard Inglewood Battalion protected on the first nights of the riots. These are in the designated areas of operations,
- Likely targets of opportunity, such as gun shops, sporting goods stores, auto parts stores, and electronic sales outlets.

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. This process was difficult and required skills and techniques unusual to common battlefield tactical intelligence. During the first week of the riot, the process was hampered by a lack of satisfactory and standardized maps and extremely large areas of operations. These should be specified in the Contingency Operation Plan for Civil Disturbances. A unit should be assigned to a specific area of operation. It could then make a careful study of its area of operations before mobilizing. It could identify facilities for operation staging areas, command posts, and temporary police headquarters, high-value targets, and indigenous gangs.

Battalion and higher-level headquarters should develop and maintain situational overlays. The military liaison officer should compare these with local police intelligence to develop possible patterns of future action by gang and counteraction by military forces.

Reconnaissance and surveillance. Military units must coordinate activities with local law enforcement agencies in their designated areas of operations. They could jointly or independently plan and execute reconnaissance and surveillance to fill in critical intelligence gaps for future operations,

Focus. Unit commanders should make more judicious use of their critical, but limited, intelligence assets. In civil disturbances, it is too easy for a battalion S2 to become simply a historian. While a bit of such information is distributed to field commanders and individual soldiers via intelligence summaries (INTSUM), it should not become the intelligence staff's focus and function. Proactivity and projection of possible enemy activity should always be the focus and intent of the S2 section,

Training

In recent years, there has been some recognition that U.S. military riot control tactics must change to meet the reality of dealing with our own citizenry in domestic civil disturbances. With the exception of tear gas agents and projectors, the basic weapon used by troops in direct contact with rioters is the rifle and bayonet. No less lethal weapon has been issued to fill the gap between anti-riot gases and deadly force.

The current level and type of riot-control training the army advocates for the National Guard does not meet our national need for handling future domestic disturbances. *Army Field Manual 29-25* (1985) should be updated. The Los Angeles riots illustrate that National Guard troops will have to be trained in military police operations and in a combination of riot control and urban combat tactics to be effective in future civil disturbances.

Interventions

The FBI report on the "Prevention and Control of Civil Disturbance" describes three levels of intervention in controlling civil disturbances: local,

state, and federal (FBI 1992).

Local intervention. The local jurisdiction should be the first responder, since it is familiar with the area, people, and environment. Agencies would be most effective acting alone, since personnel are trained in laws and ordinances applying to arrest and other administrative procedures. If a situation is beyond the capabilities of the local jurisdiction, it should implement its mutual aid agreement with cooperating jurisdictions. Generally, the officer in charge at the requesting agency would be the officer in charge of the incident.

State intervention. There are several alternatives available to local jurisdictions if they are unable to control a situation, even with the implementation of the mutual aid agreement. In most states, the highway patrol (state police) may be called on if a public danger exists (as defined by state law or ordinance). The highway patrol would supplement, not replace, local authorities. The mayor, city manager, chief of police, chief executive of the local government, or sheriff must request this aid.

The governor can authorize the State National Guard to assist in situations where there is imminent danger that is beyond the control of local authorities operating at capacity. The State National Guard, which has the authority to enforce state laws, would supplement, not replace, the local authorities.

Federal intervention. The U.S. Armed Forces also may assist to quell a civil unrest, if the situation is beyond the capabilities of local and state agencies. Each state has criteria for requesting this assistance, and the local jurisdiction should be well informed of these regulations.

Federal law prohibits the U.S. Armed Forces from performing law enforcement functions within the U.S. When the State National Guard and the U.S. Armed Forces do operate in the same area, it is possible to federalize the National Guard, placing both forces under one command. This is necessary to ensure effective management and coordination, however, there may be drawbacks to this action, as was evident in Los Angeles.

Federalizing the National Guard abolishes its power to enforce state laws, as happened in Los

Angeles, where the local police lost the services of the guard in enforcement actions such as security and looting patrol.

Use of force. Federal law requires that officers making an arrest or other seizure of person use whatever force is reasonably necessary to apprehend the person or affect the arrest. “The privilege to use force is not limited to that amount of force necessary to protect themselves, but extends to that amount reasonably necessary to enable the officers to perform their duties-i.e., to accomplish the seizure.”

The use of deadly force is permissible under the U.S. Constitution, when necessary to protect an officer or others from immediate threats of serious physical injury or to prevent the escape of dangerous persons (i.e., those who threaten officers with weapons or who are believed to have committed offenses in which serious physical injury was either inflicted or threatened). While the constitutional standard provides a boundary within which all law enforcement officers must operate, it is possible that state law may impose a stricter standard on local law enforcement within that jurisdiction. Accordingly, local officers must be familiar with both the constitutional standard defined by the Supreme Court in *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), and *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), as well as any specific standards that govern the use of force in their own jurisdictions.

Federalizing the California National Guard

On May 1, 1992, President George Bush issued a proclamation calling for all persons engaged in acts of violence and disorder in Los Angeles to cease and desist therefrom and to disperse and retire peaceably. President Bush signed the Executive Order providing for the restoration of law and order to the City and County of Los Angeles. The Order expressly addressed the applicable jurisdictional questions and provided all federal agencies with authority to act in a law enforcement capacity during the civil unrest. It authorized the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General to delegate to subordinate officials of their respective departments the authority conferred to them by the Order.

The California National Guard was federalized and placed under the direction of the U.S. military. In this instance, there seemed to have been a general misunderstanding between the U.S. military and the National Guard as to what role the military could fulfill in quelling a civil disturbance. The *City in Crisis* report states that each mistakenly assumed the federal troops and the federalized National Guard could not undertake missions requiring them to perform as peace officers. By the time the guard was federalized, the Armed Forces had set up a Joint Task Force that concluded the military would take on non-confrontational functions, allowing the law enforcement officers to take on the more common law enforcement-type operations.

By issuing the proclamation ordering insurgents to disperse, the President met the requirements under federal statute to exercise presidential power to use federal troops to quell domestic violence.

Drawbacks to federalization

After federalization, it is estimated that only 20 percent of troop requests were fulfilled by the National Guard. In considering mission requests for the guard, the military commanders would consider whether the request was for a “law enforcement” or “military” function. If the request was for a law enforcement function, it was uniformly denied, for example, a request for National Guard troops to transport prisoners arrested during the disturbance. This is a function the guard would have performed before federalization. It was denied because it was believed that performing such a mission could be a potential violation of the *Posse Comitatus* Act, which prohibits the direct, active participation of army or air force personnel in the execution of civil laws, unless expressly authorized by the U.S. Constitution or by statute. This act applies with equal force to the National Guard only when it is federalized or placed in the service of the United States.

A new level of bureaucracy is introduced with federalization that can thwart deployment of troops. Under this *modus operandi*, whenever the National Guard liaison receives the initial assignment for the LAPD or the LA County Sheriff’s Department, the liaison contacts the U.S. Army

liaison officer. The army liaison officer then refers the request to the U.S. Military's Joint Task Force. Frequently, the Joint Task Force will request more information regarding specifics of the mission. It then will decide whether the federalized troops should become involved, wanting to avoid a potential violation of the *Posse Comitatus* Act.

Federalization obviously changed the relationship between the National Guard and the LAPD. Before federalization, guard troops were completely supportive of the LAPD and other law enforcement agencies' efforts to deal with the disturbance. Several times, guard troops were asked to assist in making arrests or transporting prisoners; they also accompanied LAPD officers in squad cars. After

federalization, the number of missions or tasks given to the guard was significantly reduced. The guard was kept at full strength for the next several days but had few actual assignments to perform, creating morale problems within the ranks.

Conclusion

Calling up the National Guard and other federal agencies has an important psychological effect on how quickly order is restored in a civil unrest situation. However, without proper planning and coordination in riot control tactics, and without an update in administrative and tactical procedures, federal agencies will be underutilized in civil unrest emergencies.

APPENDIX 2

MODEL OPERATIONS PLANS

COPIES OF MODEL OPERATIONS PLANS ARE AVAILABLE
FROM THE FIRE AND POLICE AGENCIES LISTED BELOW

Atlanta, Georgia
Denver, Colorado
Long Beach, California
Los Angeles, California
Miami, Florida
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
New Orleans, Louisiana
Portland, Oregon
St. Louis, Missouri
San Diego, California
Tampa, Florida
The Greater Metropolitan Washington, D.C. Area

MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT

MISSION STATEMENT AND STAFFING PRIORITIES FIRE DEPARTMENT ESCORTS

Rationale: During a civil disturbance, Miami Fire Department Units often come under attack from hostile elements. Fire Units are an essential weapon in the suppressing of a civil disorder. The rescue element, of course, also provides important emergency medical services to the Community and the Police Department.

In order to accomplish this mission, the following procedures will go into effect upon a departmental mobilization.

Mobilization Priority

A total of eight two-person units will be assigned to fire stations as follows:

No.	2	1901 N. Miami Avenue	2-two man units
No.	5	1200 N. W. 20 Street	1-two man unit
No.	6	701 N.W. 36 Street	1-two man unit
No.	8	2975 Oak Avenue	1-two man unit
No.	9	69 N.E. 62 Street	2-two man units
No.	12	1455 N.W. 46 Street	1-two man unit

All fire stations will receive one two-man unit first. Stations No. 2 and No. 9 will then get an additional unit. Finally, if extra resources are available, other stations will get the units in this priority order: 1-Station No. 8; 2-Station No. 6; 3-Station No. 5.

The following are the mission assignments for police officers assigned to fire units,

Prior to a Perimeter Being Closed

1. The first priority will be the escort of Fire Rescue Units to calls within the affected area. Fire and Police Units responding to requests for medical services **will not** use emergency equipment when going into and out of the affected areas.
2. If there is a second two-person unit assigned to a fire station, this second unit will escort fire trucks to fire scenes. In this case, the Fire Department will respond in a Task Force configuration. This is generally a task force commander's vehicle and three fire trucks. The escorting police unit should be immediately behind the task force commander's vehicle.
3. Under **no** circumstance will police escort vehicles leave their fire units unprotected. They are expected to remain with the rescue or task force **at all times**.

When a Perimeter Is Set

In the event a perimeter is closed because of problems in an affected area, the following procedures will be in effect:

1. The two-person unit will continue to escort rescue or fire units. They will, however, receive clearance from the EOC or Fire Dispatcher before proceeding into the area.
2. If advised by the EOC or Fire Dispatcher, escort units will bring fire units to a specific intersection, where additional resources, such as field force element or SWAT, may be assigned to assist.
3. A **no** lights or siren response will be the order of the day.
4. Once again, police units **will remain** with their fire personnel at all times.

APPENDIX 3

GLOSSARY

Answering Point	A central location from which to process and disseminate information to the public.
ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
CAO	City Administrative Officer (Los Angeles).
CISD	Critical Incident and Stress Debriefing. Time-sensitive consultation done by trained department personnel after a critical incident to reduce the impact of stress on fire department members.
COMAND	Commonwealth of Virginia's Offensive Mobilization Against Narcotic Distribution. Created by executive order, the organization includes the State Police, the Department of Alcohol Beverage Control, the Department of Game & Inland Fisheries, the Department of Forestry, the Department of Aviation, the Virginia Marine Resources Commission, and the Virginia Port Authority.
EMS	Emergency Medical Services.
EMT	Emergency Medical Technical certification.
EOB	Emergency Operations Board (Los Angeles)
EOC	Emergency Operations Center. Facility for the centralized direction and control of the jurisdictions' emergency operations coordinators. It communicates with all departments in the jurisdiction, and in selected outside agencies.
EOO	Emergency Operations Organization (Los Angeles). Nerve center for deploying agencies and personnel, and coordinating activities during civil unrest.
FATS	Firearm Training System. A device that uses a life-size television screen and a laser-equipped weapon to help officers learn when to fire and who, if anyone, should be fired upon.

FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Field Commander	Officer who has line command over a given tactical area of responsibility.
IC	Incident Commander (Department Commander).
ICCNA	International Cross Cultural Network of America. A network of over 60 volunteers in Aurora, Colorado.
ICS	Incident Command System. Nerve center for coordinating response to incidents received through communication systems, such as 911. This center is under the direction of joint agency chiefs.
INTSUM	Intelligence Summaries Briefings. Distributed to National Guard field commanders.
LAFD	Los Angeles Fire Department.
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department.
Line Command	The exercise of the authority of command delegated by the Chief of Police to immediate subordinates, and by them to their subordinates, down to the lowest level of authority.
MDT	Mobile Digital Terminal. A computer terminal located in patrol vehicles that receives automatic dispatches and allows officers in the field direct access to information from the Emergency Command Control Communications System (ECCS). MDTs allow officers to send and receive messages to other personnel in the field, as well as to other bureaus.
MFD	Mesa Fire Department, Mesa, Arizona. Their successful cultural diversity program is described in Part 3.
Mutual Aid	The support and assistance rendered by agencies from one jurisdiction to another.
OES	Office of Emergency Services (Los Angeles).
Parker Center	Headquarters of the Los Angeles Police Department.
Posse Comitatus Act	A statute, codified at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1885, that prohibits involvement of the U.S. Military in traditional law enforcement functions, with certain exceptions.
PIO	Public Information Office(r).
ROVER	Mobile hand-held radio.

RTD	Rapid Transit District. The southern California Rapid Transit District.
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure(s)
Staging Area	A location approved by the joint command team for the collection, storage, maintenance, disbursement, and accounting of personnel, vehicles, supplies, and equipment used or held in reserve. May be used for the temporary storage of booked property and impounded vehicles.
SWAT Teams	Special Weapons and Tactics Teams. A special unit of law enforcement agencies trained to deal with riots, violence, terrorism, etc.
Tactical Alert	Announcement of the anticipated redistribution of on-duty officer to control an emergency.
USFA	United States Fire Administration.

APPENDIX 4

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